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Information transparency and pricing strategy in the Scottish housing market 
Abstract
Purpose: Information transparency is crucially important in price setting in real 
estate, particularly when information asymmetry is concerned. This paper empirically 
examines how a change in government policy in relation to information disclosure 
and transparency impacts residential real estate price discovery. Specially, we 
investigate how real estate traders determined asking prices in the context of the 
Scottish housing market before and after the implementation of the Home Report, 
which aimed to prevent artificially low asking prices. 
Methodology/approach: The paper employs spatial lag hedonic pricing models to 
empirically observe how residential asking prices are determined by property sellers 
in response to a change in government policy that is designed to enhance market 
transparency. It utilises over 79,000 transaction data of the Aberdeen residential 
market for the period of Q2 1998 to Q2 2013 to test the models.
Findings: The empirical findings provide some novel insights in relation to the price 
determination within the residential market in Scotland. Our spatial lag models 
suggest that spatial autocorrelation in property prices has increased since the Home 
Report came into effect, indicating that property sellers have become more prone to 
infer asking prices based on prior sales of dwellings in close vicinity. The once-
common practice of setting artificially low asking prices seems to have dwindled to a 
certain extent statistically. 
Originality: The importance of understanding the relationship between information 
transparency and property price determination has gathered momentum over the 
past decade. Although spatial hedonic techniques have been extensively used to 
study the impact of various property- and neighbourhood-specific attributes on 
residential real estate market in general, surprisingly little is known about the 
empirical relationship between spatial autocorrelation in real estate prices and 
information transparency.
1. Introduction
Pricing strategy has been an important concept in both theoretical and empirical modelling 
of housing transactions which is envisaged to impact upon the number of bids, final 
transaction price and the length of time to sell a home (Kang and Garnder, 1989; Yavas and 
Yang, 1995; Forgey et al., 1996; Arnold, 1999; Anglin et al., 2003; Pryce, 2011, Thanos and 
White, 2014). Equally, the evaluation of asking prices is also important in the valuation 
process, where estimated market value is derived from recently transacted comparable sale 
prices. As such, bias in the asking prices of comparable properties can distort the market 
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value estimate of the subject property, which in turn could lead to a divergence between 
the market value estimate and the sale price (Rabianski, 1992).
 It is widely accepted that there is a degree of information asymmetry in most housing 
markets between sellers and buyers. This occurs when sellers and their agents have better 
knowledge of a property’s qualities and location, whereas buyers are perceived to be less 
well informed (Lin and Vandell, 2007; Pope, 2008; Wong et al., 2012, Nanda and Ross, 2012). 
This effect of the improvement in information symmetry has been examined by a number of 
studies (for example, Pope, 2008; Nanda and Ross, 2012). Whilst numerous studies have 
investigated the impact of the introduction of property condition disclosure regulations on 
the selling prices, more limited analysis has been undertaken to examine the potential 
changes in the pricing strategy of the sellers.
In Scotland, the improvement in information transparency on housing transactions was also 
enforced by regulations. The Home Report scheme was introduced in December 2008,  
requiring the seller of a residential property to provide a Single Survey, an Energy Report, 
and a questionnaire when listing the property on the market. The Scottish government 
introduced the scheme with three main objectives: to improve information about a 
property’s condition, to address the cost and efficiency issue associated with multiple 
valuations and surveys, and to address the problems created by the practice of setting 
artificially low asking prices (Black et al. 2015). Indeed, this artificial setting of low asking 
prices1 has traditionally been common practice in Scotland, especially during periods of 
market upturns and sustained growth. This approach whilst benefitting sellers from the 
uncertainty and competition among potential buyers, has been heavily and publicly 
criticised for leading people, who cannot afford the property, paying for surveys to be 
undertaken. Consequently, to evaluate the extent to which the scheme met the initial 
objectives, the Scottish government carried out a five-year review in 2014.  The findings 
emanating from the review illustrated that, on first showing, the scheme appeared to be 
successful, nonetheless, when specifically addressing the issue relating to the setting 
1 The “asking price” in the “price over” (which is explained in section 2) context is not the reservation price that 
sellers would expect to achieve, or it is a ceiling price in many housing markets where buyers normally 
negotiate downward from an asking price.  It acts more like a “guide price”, which sends a signal to potential 
buyers that the seller is expecting to achieve a certain amount above of this price (Pryce, 2011).
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artificially low asking prices, the government’s review was far less conclusive on how much 
this is due to poorer market conditions. 
Accordingly, this paper attempts to complement the government review and provide some 
additional evidence as to the evaluation of potential changes in pricing strategy as a result 
of the implementation of the Home Report scheme. In this regard, we examine the potential 
changes in the relationship between asking and seller’s perceived reservation price and 
further explore the explanations for such changes using auction theories relative to the 
Scottish sealed bid context. Using housing transaction data pre and post the introduction of 
the Home Report, we empirically test whether there has been a significant statistical 
difference in asking price relative to the “value” of the property since the introduction of the 
scheme. It is believed that a better empirical understanding and conceptualisation of the 
underpinning price determination process and dynamics of the real estate market, as well as 
the effect of government policy on market transparency is of crucial significance from the 
viewpoints of buyers, sellers and other stakeholders. It is further posited that the study 
should carry implications in relation to the effectiveness of government interventions to 
tackle problems arising from information asymmetry in real estate pricing and enhance the 
overall equitability of the real estate investment environment for market participants.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the background of 
the Scottish housing market and the rationale for the enactment of the Home Report 
scheme. Section 3 explores the theories relative to pricing strategy in housing auctions with 
Section 4 offering descriptions of the data used within the empirical analysis. Sections 5 and 
6 explain the empirical modelling and provide a discussion of the empirical findings, with 
Section 7 drawing conclusions. 
2. Background of the Scottish housing market
The Scottish housing market has some unique characteristics. The dominant selling 
mechanism is the “price over” system, where properties on the mark t are listed as “offers 
over” or “price over” an amount set. When there is more than one potential buyer, the 
seller sets a “closing date” on which, offers from all the bidders are submitted in the form of 
first price sealed bid auction, and the highest offer tends to be accepted2. Gibb (1992) 
suggests that through uncertainties and opportunities created by this sealed bid system, 
sellers can capture economic rent. This is also supported by game theory which indicates 
that sealed bid auctions favour sellers in a strong market where the number of potential 
2 Sellers may also consider other conditions of the offer, such as proposed entry date.
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bidders is relatively large, and bidders are likely to be “risk averse”3. However, this system 
could be viewed as an “unethical system” from a buyer’s perspective mainly because it 
leaves estate agents open to accusations of setting artificially low asking prices to create 
fictitious competition, leading people who cannot afford the property paying for surveys.  
In 2008, a new regulation - the Home Report was introduced to the Scottish housing market. 
By law, dwellings4 listed on the market from the 1st December 2008 are required to have a 
Home Report undertaken.  This report consists of a Single Survey, an energy report and a 
questionnaire. The Single Survey is a level 2 Homebuyers Survey and Valuation (HSV) 
equivalent survey5, which includes a valuation. It should be highlighted that many mortgage 
lenders accept this valuation as the collateral value of the property. Sellers are responsible 
for the cost of the home Report, and any potential buyer can access the report via selling 
agents and property solicitor centres free of charge.
The scheme was introduced with three overarching objectives. The government believed 
that the scheme would improve housing market stability by providing the essential 
information about the properties to the buyers. However, this was met with concerns 
pertaining to the  upfront cost of the scheme and also in relation to potential conflict of 
interests in the sense that “the surveyor must produce a report that will be used by both the 
seller and buyer, two parties that have opposing interests in the property transaction – 
particularly in regards to the valuation and the repair categories” (Black, et al. 2015:5).
The government’s five-year review of the scheme included both a public consultation6 and a 
research study7 where all three objectives of Home Report were evaluated. Whilst the 
public consultation found that the majority of the respondents considered the scheme to be 
an improvement, it did still highlight concerns regarding the setting of unrealistic asking 
prices. Indeed, the findings indicated that while the valuation helped prevent the 
3 Bidders being risk averse refers to the fear of not being able to win the auction.
4 This includes all private properties listed in the market, excluding “right to buy” properties, and some of the 
new developments.
5According to Royal Institute of Charter Surveyors (RICS), level 2 HSV shows the condition of the property, and 
includes a market valuation and insurance rebuild costs. It also provides guidance to legal advisors and advice 
on defects that may affect the value of the property such as repairs, and ongoing maintenance.
6 Chartered surveyors, legal profession and estate agent respondents, local authorities, construction industry 
respondents, consumer, advice & campaign groups and property management, maintenance and conservation 
respondents were consulted.
7 The research study surveyed 928 households in Scotland.
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occurrence of artificially low asking price (to a certain degree), it is less useful in doing so in 
a rising market (Robertson & Blair, 2014). That said, the research study also suggested that 
relatively poorer market conditions could also have contributed in addressing the issue of 
artificially low asking prices (Black, et al. 2015). Further, the findings of the government’s 
five-year review of the Home Report is based on both qualitative data and descriptive 
analysis. In this regard, it acknowledges but fails to control for the effect of changes in 
market conditions on pricing behaviours.  With the use of a rich set of market transaction 
data for a specific case study area, North East Scotland, this paper complements the 
government review by providing further quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of the 
policy objective in relation to price setting in the housing market.
Previous research has theoretically and empirically corroborated that the choice of real 
estate marketing system in a given locality is indeed primarily dependent on the degree of 
variation in buyer search cost as well as seller holding cost (Quan 2002), information 
asymmetries between the contracting parties and their respective levels of risk aversion 
(McAfee and McMillan, 1987). Alternative forms of real estate pricing arrangements exist in 
other regions of the U.K. and elsewhere with the fixed-price system being the most 
commonly adopted in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The fixed-price mechanism 
requires the seller to publicly disclose his reservation price whilst prospective buyers 
compete for the property on a first-come-first-serve basis. The fixed price essentially serves 
as a limit on the offers that the seller receives, which provides a greater degree of certainty 
for the willing buyers over the maximum price they will have to pay for the home 
(Buschbom et al., 2018). Gan (2013) attributes the adoption of the fixed price system to the 
loss-averse nature of the seller as choosing a fixed price virtually implies revealing a strong 
market signal to sell the property, particularly when the seller is under financial pressure to 
release capital tied up in the current property to, for example, buy another property. In the 
United States, residential property transactions are done mainly through direct negotiation 
whereby the seller and the prospective buyer have to bargain over the price in a series of 
offers and counter-offers. Usually, the process is conducted with the professional assistance 
of their property brokers or agents to reconciliate differences and reduce search cost and 
information asymmetries between the parties concerned.
3. Seller’s pricing strategy in the Scottish housing market
In most housing markets, asking prices are typically set by agreement between the seller 
and the acting agent. This is determined according to knowledge of the acquisition price, 
the costs of improvements and maintenance, housing attributes, and the selling prices of 
similar properties nearby. Selling agents have insightful local market knowledge and more 
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comprehensive information and data on recent transactions, based on which they advise 
their clients on a pricing strategy. As highlighted by Thanos and White (2014), asking prices 
are therefore set according to the strategic behaviour of sellers with private values, as well 
as a perception of the “common value” element in the market advised by selling agents – 
the “expert advice”. 
Search model analysis as proffered by Yavas and Yang (1995:366) argues that asking price 
serves as a signalling function “that maps the listing price to the seller’s valuation of the 
property”. This implies that a lower asking price signals that the seller might accept a lower 
price, therefore increases the probability of sale and increases the expected selling price 
through this channel (Horowitz 1992; Yavas & Yang, 1995; Pryce, 2011). However, in a 
market where the asking price serves as a ceiling price, a lower asking price also reduces the 
upper end of the potential bids distribution, thus reduces the expected sale price (Horowitz 
1992; Yavas & Yang, 1995). Consequently, sellers in such markets often face a trade-off 
between the time on the market (selling quickly) and achieving a higher sales price. 
In the Scottish housing market, the “price over” asking price is not a ceiling price, the 
common “expert advice”, certainly prior to the introduction of the Home Report, was to set 
an asking price below that of the expected selling price to achieve a high price (Levin and 
Pryce, 2007). In a sense, the “price over” amount is equivalent to a starting price in a 
conventional auction. There are two conflicting theories regarding the influence of starting 
price in auctions. The first suggests that a low starting price reduces the barrier to an 
auction, therefore increases the number of potential bidders (Ariely and Simonson, 2003; 
Kamins et al., 2004; Simonson and Ariely, 2005). This auction theory suggests that the 
optimal bid from each bidder in a sealed price auction rises as the number of bidders 
increases under both the “private value” and “common value” models8, implying that a 
higher selling price is expected with greater number of bidders (Wilson, 1997; Laffont, 1996). 
8 It is worth noting that auction theories tend to distinguish between two models that make assumptions on 
the information possessed by participants concerning the valuation of the auction subject in question, namely 
the “independent private value” and “common value” models. With the independent private value model, 
each bidder is assumed to have his own valuation and different realisations of the value of the auction subject 
(Paarsch and Hong, 2006). Knowing other bidders’ valuations will not change the bidder valuation. In a 
“common value” model, the actual value is the same for all bidders. Bulow and Klemperer (2002) suggest that 
a house’s value has both elements, but due to complicity, housing auctions are normally modelled under 
either value. 
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Indeed, Ooi et al. (2006) illustrate such relationships in a theoretical model based on 
“private value”, and also provide empirical evidence that supports the theoretical analysis 
using sealed price auction data on land transactions in Singapore. Equally, research 
undertaken by Levin and Pryce (2007) employed a simulation model based on a hypothetical 
database of 30,000 house valuations in the Scottish “price over” system. Their results found 
that the probability of extreme bids (high selling price) increased from over 5% to 18% when 
the number of bidders rises from 1 to 4. This confirms that the setting of low asking prices 
to attract bidders in the Scottish offers over system therefore seems to be a logical strategy.
Arguably, the winning bid is also influenced by bidders’ risk aversion, in a sealed bid 
environment. Risk aversion does not alter bidder’s behaviour in an open auction, because 
they, in theory, will stop bidding if the reservation price is reached9. However, in a sealed 
auction, a risk averse bidder (who has the fear of losing) may also be willing to pay a 
premium – in the form of a higher bid – for the insurance of winning (Maskin and Riley, 
1985)10. As Pryce (2011) contends, this provides an explanation for the supposed popularity 
of the offers over system during market upswings, as buyers are more “desperate” to buy: 
dwellings are selling relatively fast, and buyers face higher opportunity costs to viewing as 
the probability of viewed dwellings being sold to other buyers increase. By setting low 
asking price, the seller increases the probability of viewings, thereby increases the 
probability of a viewer submitting a bid due to the risk of not finding a better alternative 
during his search period.
An alternative theory regarding starting price is that the initial price represents what Tversky 
and Kahenamn (1974) describe as an anchor. More specifically, a low starting price would 
indicate a low value and result in fewer bidders and a low(er) winning bid (Ariely and 
Simonson. 2003). Empirical studies examining this concept have tended to find mixed 
effects of starting price on the final winning bid in online English auctions (Ariely and 
Simonson, 2003; Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007). However, there has been limited analysis of 
starting price in sealed bid real estate auctions. It is important to note that the influence of 
starting price on the final selling price in an auction is likely to diminish if salient reference 
prices are available (Ariely and Simonson, 2003). For example, if consumers have a well-
9 Ignoring irrational exuberance.
10 see Maskin and Riley, 1985 for a full discussion of their theoretical model for this argument.
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established reference price for an auctioned subject, the starting price may have relatively 
small effect on the final price. This may explain the rationale of using methods such as those 
adopted in the Home Report to address the problems associated with the setting of 
artificially low asking prices. The fundamental change with the scheme is that the Home 
Report Valuation acts as a “price marker” for buyers and is often used in negotiation over 
price (Black et al., 2015). Since the valuation serves as the reference price, it is more likely to 
serve the “signalling function” of seller’s reservation price. Importantly, it also indicates the 
collateral value for mortgage purposes, therefore reduces the level of uncertainty for the 
buyers.  With all these respects, the valuation is likely to determine the potential bids 
distribution, and there is less incentive for the sellers to set an asking price that derives 
hugely from the valuation. Arguably, the effect of the Home Report scheme is that the 
“price over” asking price has become more correlated to valuations, which are normally 
obtained through the comparable method using market transactions of recently sold nearby 
properties. 
Based on the discussion above, we posit, firstly, that spatial autocorrelation in asking prices 
to selling price of properties in proximity should have increased since the implementation of 
the Home report as property prices are determined, to a large degree, on the basis of values 
of nearby properties. Empirically testing this proposition serves to establish whether the 
Home Report has achieved its objectives in relation to market transparency on one hand 
and inform future policy decisions on the other. Secondly, along the same line of logic, it is 
surmised that the Home Report should have reduced the difference between the asking 
price and the underlying value of the subject property given an increased level of 
transparency in the property price discovery process. The degree of such price deviation, we 
conjecture, should be dependent to the neighbourhood characteristic as well as property-
level attributes. Therefore, this paper sets out to test the following three hypotheses in 
relation to the determination of asking prices of properties in Scotland:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): since the introduction of the Home Report, spatial autocorrelation in 
asking prices to selling price of nearby properties has become more pronounced; and
Hypothesis 2 (H2): the introduction of the Home Report has reduced the deviation of asking 
price from the underlying value of the property.
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By testing the above hypotheses with market transactions data pre- and post- introduction 
of the Scheme, we should be able to empirically corroborate whether, and to what extent, 
the Home Report Scheme has achieved its stated objectives, and whether the property 
market has become more informationally efficient in terms of pricing. 
4. Data
Transaction data on private residential properties from Aberdeen Solicitors Property Centre 
(ASPC)11 was obtained on the basis of the non-disclosure agreement between University of 
Aberdeen and ASPC.  The dataset covers the housing market in Aberdeen and 
Aberdeenshire (Figure 1)12, and contains information on the physical attributes of the 
property, information on asking and selling prices, listing dates, transaction dates, and the 
method of sales. 
[insert figure 1 here]
While the dataset commences in 1984, this study focuses on the time period between the 
second quarter of 1998 and the second quarter of 2013. This is due to the availability of 
geographical coordinates that are used in the analysis. In total, there are 79,648 
observations in the data from (Q2 1998 to Q2 2013), 90% of which are successful 
transactions, with less than 10% of these properties withdrawn from ASPC without being 
sold. In total, 70,642 observations are used in the empirical modelling stage (Section 5), due 
to missing and incomplete variables. Table 1 provides a summary of the variables included 
in the empirical analysis and their descriptions.
[insert Table 1]
During the time period, over 82% of the properties in the dataset were marketed as “price 
over”, whereas “fixed price” dominates the remaining 18% of the sample. The proportion of 
properties marketed as “price over” varies according to market conditions, ranging from 60% 
in the late 1990s to over 90% in mid 2000s. Following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the 
11 ASPC was the first Solicitors Property Centre established in the UK, and serves as a central marketing place 
for residential properties and small commercial properties in the region. Approximately 90% of private 
residential properties in North East Scotland are marketed through ASPC.
12 The map of Aberdeen Housing Market defined by local authorities is presented in Figure 1, it covers 
Aberdeen city local authority jurisdiction as well the commuting towns in Aberdeenshire.
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market witnessed a reduction of properties marketed as “price over”, however the 
popularity of this selling mechanism started to increase again in 2010, symbolic of the start 
of the market recovery phase. By 2013, 87% of properties in Aberdeen were marketed as 
“price over”.
Since the valuations of the properties are not available in the dataset13, a limitation of the 
research is that we cannot directly observe how asking price is set relative to the valuation 
of the market. The asking-selling price spread - “price premium”, is calculated as a 
percentage difference between the transaction price and the asking price14 for each quarter 
for both “price over” transactions and “fixed price” transactions. Figure 2 shows the average 
deflated house price with reference to the vertical axis, the average price premium for 
“price over” transactions and “fixed price” transactions with reference to the left hand side 
vertical axis during the time period. The average house price is affected by both national 
and local oil and gas dominated economic conditions. 
[insert figure 2 here]
It is evident that fluctuations in “price over” premiums are much more pronounced in the 
time series, with an average of around 6% observed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and 
over 40% in the second quarter of 2007. These changes undoubtedly reflect the market 
upturn witnessed across most, if not all, advanced economies caused by financialisation and 
macroeconomic conditions. Notably, the very large premiums between 2006 and early 2008 
are not due to a few extreme values in the sample. This is in line with the explanations on 
market conditions’ influence on pricing strategy discussed in the previous section. 
The signs of subprime mortgage crisis started in the second quarter of 2007, during which 
time, both house prices and offers over premiums peaked. The decreases of average house 
price commenced from Q3 2007, which was accompanied by a decline in price premiums. 
Nevertheless, “price over” premiums were still relatively large throughout the first three 
quarters of 2008. Notably, the first quarter of 2009, shortly after the introduction of the 
Home Report with observed price premiums for “price over” transactions reducing 
13 Before the introduction of the Home Report, valuations are instructed by buyers, and often multiple 
valuations were carried for the same properties by different buyers, such information was not recorded by  
ASPC. 
14 Price premium = (sold price – asking price) / asking price
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significantly to below 5% on average. Although the average house price also experienced a 
decrease simultaneously, the price decline was relatively insignificant. The average price 
premium for properties sold as “fixed price” on the other hand shows much less variation 
throughout the property cycle. Indeed, Figure 1 suggests that although market conditions 
play an important role in determining “price over” premiums, given the relatively high 
average price in Aberdeen post-GFC, there may be other forces that fundamentally changed 
the way in which the “price over” mechanism works. 
5. Methodology and development of empirical models
Since the seminal work of Rosen (1974), there has been a broad consensus in the real estate 
literature that the hedonic valuation method provides a reliable and robust analytical 
environment to model property prices. The model is designed to predict or explain property 
market value using equations that accounts for variation in historical transaction prices as a 
function of different housing attributes. Nonetheless, the traditional hedonic approach does 
not explicitly take the locations and/or other spatial characteristics of the dwellings into 
consideration, which often results in inefficient estimation and biased inference due to the 
presence of spatially autocorrelated errors (Dubin et al., 1999). In light of this, the spatial lag 
hedonic valuation method (SLM) developed by Can (1992 and 1997) is utilised in this study 
to ascertain the degree of impact of the Home Report on property prices in Scotland. 
Generally speaking, a spatial lag model assumes that the transaction price of a dwelling at 
any given point in time can be expressed as a function of not only its structural attributes 
and the quality of the neighbourhood but also price effects from prior transactions within its 
close proximity. Hence, there should be a functional inter-relationship between the sales 
price of the subject dwelling and the prior transaction prices of other dwellings within its 
neighbourhood. In practice, these price effects are acknowledged and injected by the 
traders and valuers in the property market through “the comparable-sales” valuation 
method to estimate real estate prices (Can (1997) and Wong et al. (2013)). Indeed, spatial 
lag hedonic modelling techniques have been extensively employed in the literature to 
investigate real estate issues and problems. Examples include Kim et al. (2003) and McCord 
et al. (2018) who examine the relationship between residential property market and air 
pollution; McCord et al. (2019) who confirms an empirical linkage between energy 
performance certificate and property value; Haider and Miller (2000) who explores the 
effect of transportation infrastructure on residential property prices; Li and Joh (2016) who 
studies the synergistic economic benefit of enhancing bikeability and public transit 
accessibility with respect to real estate prices in an urban setting; and more recently, 
Barreca et al. (2020) who assesses how the real estate market is influenced by the level of 
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urban vibrancy. In the following sub-sections, we develop a number of spatial lag hedonic 
models to test the hypotheses formulated in Section 3. 
Testing H1
To test H1, we start with the following hedonic equation:
 …… (Equation 1)   𝑙𝑛Pi,t = c + ∑
K
k = 1βkSk +δ∑
n
k = 1Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h +ε
                                                                  𝑤𝑖𝑡h 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
where  is the asking price of property  at time ;  is a constant term;  is a bundle of 𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 𝑖 𝑡 𝑐 𝑆𝑘
structural characteristics of the subject property  described in Table 1.  is the implicit  βk
price for the corresponding . Since it is conjectured that sellers also use evidence of 𝑆𝑘
recently sold nearby properties when they set asking price, asking price is therefore 
expected to correlate with nearby properties transaction prices. To account for such pricing 
behaviour, a spatiotemporal term  is included in the equation.  is the ∑nk = 1Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h Pj,t ― h
actual transaction price of property  at time t-h, with 15,  is a spatial 𝑗 ℎ = 2 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑊𝑖,𝑗
weight that reflects the degree as well as the structure of spatial proximity between 
properties and . Mathematically,  can take one of the following forms: 𝑖 𝑗 𝑊𝑖,𝑗
 ……(Equation 1.1)Wi, j =
1
di, j 
 ……(Equation 1.2)Wi, j =
1
𝑑2𝑖,𝑗 
 ……(Equation 1.3)Wi, j =
1
𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑗 
where  denotes the Euclidean distance measured in meter between property  and ; 𝑑𝑖, 𝑗 𝑖 𝑗 Wi,j
is so constructed since it is reasonable to assume that sellers would place heavier weight on  
more proximate properties in setting property price. The most typical measures (see Cliff 
and Ord, 1981, Basu, 1998 and Dublin, 1998) include inverse distances (Equation 1.1), 
15 We also used longer periods, and two months lag produced the highest spatial correlation coefficient.
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inverse distances raised to some power (in Equation 1.2, we use distance-squared), and 
inverse exponential distance (Equation 1.3). Moreover, given that , the spatial ∑nk = 1𝑊𝑖, 𝑗 = 1
autoregressive term  suggests a weighted average of spatially lagged price 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗,𝑡 ― ℎ
information. The parameter  therefore can indicate the degree to which sellers extract  𝛿
price information from prior sales to ascertain asking prices, and hence H1 can be tested. If 
past information is relevant and applicable,  should be non-zero and statistically significant. 𝛿
In other words, housing prices are spatially auto-correlated. Finally,  is an error term that εi,t
measures the effects stemming from missing variables, misspecification of the model, 
measurement errors and inadequate sampling. This specification essentially assumes a 
linear functional form and fixed parameters. 
It must also be highlighted that while neighbourhood attributes are commonly employed 
and explicitly measured in a typical hedonic model, they are intentionally left out in our 
analysis. We surmise that the inclusion of  can indeed capture a set of Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h
neighborhood features pertaining to the socioeconomic and physical make-up of the 
neighbourhood and accessibility to various urban services and amenities. In addition, 
variables that are normally used to control for market conditions are not included in 
Equation (1) for the same reason. The omission of such variables should thus avoid potential 
statistical nuisances associated with over-specification of our models.
In addition to the spatial autoregressive variable, a dummy variable, , is 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛
included in the hedonic equation to explicitly discern properties that are withdrawn from 
the market after listing. Modifications of the equation yields Equation (2) below:








βkSk + λ𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛 + ε
…...(Equation 2)
where  takes the value 1 if the property is withdrawn from the market, and 0 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛
otherwise; and  is coefficients to be estimated. It is expected that overpriced properties are λ
more likely to experience difficulties to sell, some of which may even be withdrawn from the 
market.
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To test H1, which is deduced from the proposition that sellers have become more prone to 
infer asking prices based on actual prices of nearby recently transacted properties since the 
introduction of the Home Report Scheme, thereby increasing the spatial autocorrelation in 
the property prices, Equation (2) is thus modified by including a dummy variable, . 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
The variable is designed to interact with .  has a value of 1 if the Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
observation occurs on or after 1st December 2008, and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, we develop 
Equation (3) as follows:












βkSk + λ𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛 + ε
 …… (Equation 3)                                                                    𝑤𝑖𝑡h 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
The coefficient of   is expected to be positive and statistically significant, if sellers have ρ
indeed given more weight to nearby transactions when they set asking prices for the subject 
properties since the introduction of the Home Report. In other words, we should observe a 
stronger spatial autocorrelation between asking prices and nearby transaction prices after 
the scheme came into effect.
Testing H2
The second hypothesis formulated in this paper tests whether there is a reduction in 
deviation between asking price and the “value” of the property after the implementation of 
the scheme. More specifically, it tests whether potential house sellers are less inclined to 
market their properties by setting an unrealistically low asking price relative to the 
properties’ potential market value after December 2008. To measure the degree of such 
pricing deviation,  16 is used:𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
    …… (Equation 4)𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖 =
𝑃𝐴𝑖
𝑃𝐸𝑖
where   is the actual asking price of property , and  is the estimated value of the 𝑃𝐴𝑖 𝑖 𝑃𝐸𝑖
property obtained from the following equation:









16 This follows the concept of degree of overpricing in Kang and Garder (1989); Yavas and Yang (1995); Donald 
et al (1996); Anglin et al (2003); and Pryce (2011). Seller’s pricing strategy is presented by an asking price 
relative to the value of the property.
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 …… (Equation 5)𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
Where  is the sale price of property  at time .  is the fitted value of   for each P′i, t  𝑖 𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑖 P′i, t
dwelling obtained by estimating Equation (5). 
We further posit that  is a function of the structural variable , since sellers are Devi,t Sk
expected to have better knowledge of the quality of the property, and their pricing strategy 
should reflect this accordingly. Pryce (2011) argues that the asking-selling price spread is 
likely to contain a locational convention  (i.e. neighbourhoods may have implicit 𝛾 ∗𝑘
conventions on asking-selling price spread). However,  is not directly observable in the 𝛾 ∗𝑘
dataset, we therefore use the standard deviation of the actual asking-selling price spread 
 within the neighbourhood  as a proxy for the locational convention:𝜎𝑖,𝑘 𝑘
…… (Equation 6)𝜎𝑖, 𝑘 = 𝑆𝐷(𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑘)
Neighbourhood is defined as a 3-kilometre radius circle17 centred at property . In addition, 𝑘  𝑖
we only consider transactions that occur within the past two months prior to the sale of 
property  when computing . One would expect that within a neighbourhood , if the 𝑖 𝜎𝑖,𝑘 𝑘
standard deviation of asking-selling price spread is small, there is likely to be a 𝜎𝛾𝑖𝑘 
“locational convention”. On the other hand, if the variation in the asking-selling price spread 
is large, the evidence of locational convention  should be less apparent. To test this, 𝛾 ∗𝑘
Equation (7) is constructed.  is expected to have a significant effect on  and  𝜎𝑖, 𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝜔
should be negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, it has been established that 
market conditions also play an important role in price setting (Pryce, 2011), hence, we posit 
that ,  a time dummy variable (with a coefficient   to be estimated) measured on a 𝑇 φ
monthly basis, should affect :𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
=  …… (Equation 7)𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 c + ∑
K
k = 1βkSk +𝜔𝜎𝑖, 𝑘 + φT + ε
Lastly,   is added to Equation (8) to test H2. We believe that the Home Report should 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
have a market-wide impact on how sellers set their initial prices. In particular, the practice 
of setting artificially low asking prices to draw more potential house buyers to bid will cease 
to a large extent. Accordingly, we re-write Equation (7) as follows:
= Ω  …… (Equation 8)𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 c + 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008 + ∑
K
k = 1βkSk +𝜔𝜎𝑖, 𝑘 + φT +ε
 is expected to be positive and statistically significant.Ω
We estimate the equations using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods. Our models are 
designed in such a way that only past events can exert influence on current events but not 
vice versa. This can largely avoid statistical inference problems such as endogeneitiy in the 
17 The choice of the size of neighbourhood k is not arbitrarily determined. Indeed, the size of Aberdeen city 
(including Old Aberdeen) is roughly equal to that of a 3-km radius circle. 
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spatial lag terms. Provided that the error terms of the equations are independent and 
identically distributed, the OLS estimator will be asymptotically efficient and consistent. The 
summary statistics of the variables are shown in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 here]
6. Regression results and discussions
Results for H1
Table 3 presents the regression results for Equation (1) to (3) using the three specifications 
of spatial weight respectively. The p-value for each variable is given in brackets. The last 
three rows of the table display the R-squared, adjusted R-squared and F-statistics of the 
models. 
[Insert Tables 3  here]
Most coefficients estimated using Equation (1) in all three measures of spatial weight show 
the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. For example, sellers are 
prone to demand a higher price for qualities such as extra bedrooms, public rooms, 
bathrooms, central heating, garage(s), double glazing, and cloak room (WC). New properties 
also tend to fetch have a higher asking price. Dummy variable  yields negative 𝐺𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛
coefficients with all three spatial weighting specifications, which seems to be counter-
intuitive. However, these coefficients became statistically insignificant once the variables on 
selling mechanisms and withdrawn properties are specified. Overall, the results on the 
property-specific variables are in agreement with those in the hedonic literature (e.g. Can 
(1992) and McCord et al. (2018))
In regard to testing H1, which states that asking prices are assumed to be spatially linked to 
prices of nearby properties sold within the previous two months. We observe that the 
coefficients of the spatial lag term, , are 0.0339, 0.1599, and 0.1131 respectively under that  δ
three different spatial specifications, and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
confirms our view that the housing prices are spatially auto-correlated. Of significance is the 
positive sign of the coefficient, which implies that house prices seem to move in tandem 
with one another: a higher (lower) price of a neighbouring property will generally result in a 
higher (lower) asking price of the subject property. Indeed, the findings echo Can (1997), 
which reveals spatial spillover/adjacency effect of absolute property prices arising from 
prior sales within an immediate neighbourhood via a practice of “comparable-sales”.  
Interestingly, the effect of  are very different across the three specifications with Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h
the size the magnitude of the variable appearing to be larger when non-liner measures (as 
in Equation 1.2 and Equation 1.3) are employed. In sum, the models achieve an explanatory 
power of around 50%.
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As a modification of Equation (1), Equation (2) is designed to examine how properties that 
are withdrawn from the market are priced differently by the sellers. The coefficients on 
Withdrawn, significant at the 1% level, range from 0.1390 to 0.1769 across the three spatial 
weight specifications, suggesting that this category of properties tend to be priced 15%-19% 
higher than the others, ceteris paribus. We surmise the fact that the properties are 
overpriced relative to other properties on the market could be a reason why they are 
withdrawn.
Equation (3) incorporates an interaction term, , to the model, which is  𝐷𝑒𝑐2008 × Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h
designed to examine whether property sellers rely more on prior sales from the 
neighbourhood in ascertaining asking prices after the inception of the Home Report scheme. 
We find that the coefficients on the interaction term with all three specifications are around 
0.05 and significant at the 1% level. This confirms our belief that after December 2008, 
asking prices are more spatially dependent on nearby sale prices by virtue of the price 
discovery process of the sellers given a more informationally efficient housing market. 
Hence, the Home Report might have increased the overall transparency of the market.
Results for H2
Equation (7) is formulated to investigate the determinants of pricing strategy, which is 
measured as the asking price relative to the estimated value derived from our hedonic 
model. Equation (8) further incorporates a dummy variable that indicates represents the 
introduction of the Home Report to test H2. Table 4 depicts the regressions results for H2 
under the three spatial weighting specifications. 
[insert Table 4]
Examining the results for Equation (7), locational convention measure  yields negative 𝜎𝑖, 𝑘
and significant coefficients with Equation (1.2) and (1.3) specifications. This is in line with 
our expectation that in a neighbourhood where there is a higher variation in the asking-
selling price spread, the effect of locational convention should be less apparent with sellers 
being  more likely to set asking prices that diverge more from the underlying values. The 
results also reveal that some housing attributes exhibit statistically significant effect on the 
dependent variable, suggesting that sellers do consider certain housing attributes such as 
number of bedrooms and heating systems when pricing their properties.
Lastly,  is incorporated to Equation (8) to test H2. Its coefficient is 0.0523, 0.0274, 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
0.0397 under the three spatial weight specifications (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3) respectively. In all 
three cases, the coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Mathematically, it can be 
interpreted that there is a reduction in asking price valuation deviation. More precisely 
specifically, the ratio between asking price and the value of the property is 3%-5% closer to 
1. This suggests that the marketing strategies employed to set unrealistically low asking 
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prices by the sellers have become less evidenced since the introduction of the Home Report 
scheme, however, the magnitude of such effect is relatively small. 
In terms of R-squared and adjusted R-squared, our models achieve an explanatory power of 
around 40% for all the three spatial weight specifications. The estimation is marginally 
improved when location convention measure is taken into consideration. One might argue 
that the relatively low R-square could undermine the validity of the findings of the study. 
However, the main emphasis of this paper is on whether the Scheme affects the way sellers 
determine asking prices, not on the discovery of various determinants of valuation deviation 
of real estate price formation. Therefore, it should be highlighted that only the 
improvement of R-square, as well as the signs and statistical significance of the variables of 
interest in the models that are of crucial relevance to our research.
As a robustness test, we generate Equation (9) by discarding all statistically insignificant 
structural variables with p-value below 1% in Equation (8). It is shown that the results are 
highly consistent with those of the other models. For instance, the model using as 1/𝑑𝑖, 𝑗
spatial weight (with Floor and the property type variables removed) suggests a reduced level 
of asking price deviation post-2008, given that the coefficient on  is positive and 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
statistically significant at the 1% level. The model produces an adjusted R-squared of 0.4431, 
which is comparable to that of the original model. Similar findings are observed in the 
model using the spatial specification of inverse exponential distances (with Garden, Floor 
and the property type variables discarded) in terms of the signs and statistical significance of 
 and other hedonic attributes.𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates how property sellers determine asking prices in response to a 
change in government policy with the use of a large number of real estate transactions in 
the North East of Scotland. By subjecting the analysis in an information search context and 
in a hedonic setting that explicitly incorporates a spatial process of price discovery using 
spatial lag modelling techniques and controls for a large number of housing attributes (i.e. 
to test H1), we find strong prima facie evidence that property sellers have become more 
prone to rely on prior sales to establish asking prices since the introduction of a new 
government policy, namely the Home Report , as indicated by an elevated level of spatial 
autocorrelation in the sample house prices across all statistical models examined. The once-
common practice of setting artificially low asking price with the aim to attract buyers seems 
to have dwindled to a certain extent. In other words, after the Scheme came into effect, real 
estate sellers seem to have set prices on a basis that is more closely in line with the general 
market conditions and the underlying value of property. The results of testing H2 in our 
analysis, which compares price divergence pre- and post- 2008 2018, further confirms this 
conjecture. More specifically, our statistical models reveal that the accuracy of property 
pricing has, on average, improved by a factor of 3 - 5% after the implementation of the 
Scheme.
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A major learning outcome of this study is to provide robust evidence-based justifications for 
necessary government interventions to help address issues associated with market failures 
stemming from information asymmetry between buyers and sellers within a property 
market. Prior to the introduction of the Home Report, problems concerning the propensity 
of property sellers in Scotland artificially lowering initial asking prices were rife, placing 
potential buyers in a relatively weaker bargaining position. Indeed, an early investigation by 
Akerlof (1970) suggests that information asymmetry, which deters market participants from 
making mutually advantageous trade in a free enterprise economy, is particularly more 
widespread in markets dominated by second-hand assets such as direct real estate. This is 
due to the fact that sellers of second-hand homes are better informed about the quality of 
the dwellings than the buyers, and consequently creating an unlevel playing field when it 
comes to pricing. Our empirical results support the view that government should play a 
more active role in facilitating transactions in the real estate market by putting forward 
measures that counteract such information asymmetry in property pricing, ensuring a 
higher degree of market transparency which could result in enhanced market information 
efficiency and equitability that benefit not only the market players but also the society at 
large.
From a methodological stance, this study demonstrates how housing policies can be 
empirically evaluated and scrutinised in the framework of spatial hedonic price modelling, 
which is one of the greatest departures from the mainstream real estate literature.  Existing 
approaches to examining institutional arrangements of housing market have been 
predominately normative or descriptive in nature, often producing elusive and subjective 
explanations, conclusions and implications that cannot be hypothesised and/or validated 
with empirical data. We believe that the findings and the methodology of the study yield 
both theoretical and practical insights into real estate price formation and modelling, which 
are of great use and interest to various categories of property stakeholders. For instance, 
the hedonic models developed in the paper demonstrate that a parsimonious model with a 
high degree of explanatory power could be achieved by accounting for spatially lagged 
pricing information through incorporating a spatial autoregressive process that reduces the 
number of housing attributes to be considered in the analysis, providing a justification for 
adopting a simple yet reliable valuation approach to conducting mass property appraisals 
for valuers, policy makers and other property professionals. From he perspective of 
property investors and property developers, the results in relation to property price 
deviation in Scotland presented in the study provides evidence-based explanations on how 
real estate prices could respond to government interference dynamically vis-a-vis the 
changing levels of the overall market transparency and information asymmetry resulting 
from the implementation of a new housing policy, which should bear implications for 
formulating arbitrage and trading strategies in real estate investment, as well as conducting 
policy evaluation in the arena of public services delivery. 
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Last but not least, we acknowledge that the scope of the current study is somewhat limited 
in terms of the amount of data explored, which only covers a cross section of the entire 
Scottish residential property market. We therefore contend that the current study could be 
further extended to incorporate comparison with other cities in the U.K. and elsewhere 
where different institutional arrangements in property pricing and marketing are in place.
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Figure 1. Housing market areas of Aberdeen city and Aberdeenshire.
Source: Aberdeen City Council
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Figure 2, Asking-selling price premiums and average real house price in Aberdeen 
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Table 1: descriptions of variables:
Variable Description/Type
Heating type (Heating) 1 if property has central heating, =0  if property has no heating or 
any other form of heating
Double Glazed 1 if property has double glazing, otherwise =0
Garden 1 if property has garden(s), otherwise =0 
Floor Number of floor stories within the dwelling: 1 for flat and 
bungalows, 2 or more for multi-storey houses
Bathroom Number of bathrooms.
Bedroom Number of bedrooms
WC Number of separate toilets/cloak rooms
Public Number of public rooms, including kitchen, lounge, conservatory, 
play room, etc.
𝐷𝑒𝑐2008 1 if property was listed on and after December 1st 2008, otherwise 
=0
Garage If a property has a garage(s)
New 1 if property is a new build, otherwise =0
Withdrawn 1 if pr perty was withdrawn from the market, otherwise=0
Type D 1 if dwelling is detached property, otherwise=0
Type F 1 if dwelling is a flat, otherwise=0
Type N 1 if dwelling is non-detached property, otherwise=0
Dev Ratio: the deviation between asking price and the “value” of the 
property after the implementation of the scheme.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the main variables
Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pi,t GBP£ 131 239 107 836 9000 3500000
𝑉𝑖,𝑡 GBP£ 134 097 106 729 24077 6002596
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 Ratio 0.9999 0.0244 0.8320 1.3730
𝑆𝐷(𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑘) --- 0.2761 0.0022 0.2017 0.3183
Heating Dummy Var. 0.8128 0.3900 0 1
DoubleGlazed Dummy Var. 0.8778 0.3274 0 1
Garden Dummy Var. 0.5971 0.4904 0 1
Floor Number 1.4585 0.5596 1 6
Bathroom Number 0.9165 0.3599 0 4
Bedroom Number 2.3297 1.1398 0 9
Garage Number 0.3637 0.6038 0 8
WC Number 0.1630 0.3784 0 3
Public Number 1.4747 0.8033 0 14
𝐷𝑒𝑐2008 Dummy Var. 0.2450 0.4301 0 1
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Table 3: Regression results for Equations 1 to 3 
Dependent 
Variable
𝐏𝐢,𝐭       𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭
Spatial Weight 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋
Independent 
Variables
Eqn 1 Eqn 2 Eqn 3 Eqn 1 Eqn 2 Eqn 3 Eqn 1 Eqn 2 Eqn 3














































































































































































































































































Included Obs. 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642
𝑅2 0.5085 0.5218 0.6600 0.5293 0.5476 0.6759 0.5229 0.5399 0.6720
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅2 0.5084 0.5217 0.6599 0.5292 0.5475 0.6759 0.5228 0.5398 0.6719
Prob (F Stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: p-values are in brackets
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Table 4: Regression results for Equations 7 to 9
Dependent 
Variable
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
Spatial Weight 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 𝟏/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋
Independent 
Variables


















































































































































































































































Included Obs. 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070
𝑅2 0.4435 0.4449 0.4446 0.3946 0.3950 0.3945 0.4005 0.4013 0.4009
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅2 0.4420 0.4434 0.4431 0.3930 0.3934 0.3930 0.3988 0.3997 0.3994
Prob (F Stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: p-values are in brackets
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Information transparency and pricing strategy in the Scottish housing market 
Abstract
Purpose: Information transparency is crucially important in price setting in real estate, 
particularly when information asymmetry is concerned. This paper empirically 
examines how a change in government policy in relation to information disclosure and 
transparency impacts residential real estate price discovery. Specially, we investigate 
how real estate traders determined asking prices in the context of the Scottish housing 
market before and after the implementation of the Home Report, which aimed to 
prevent artificially low asking prices. 
Methodology/approach: The paper employs spatial lag hedonic pricing models to 
empirically observe how residential asking prices are determined by property sellers 
in response to a change in government policy that is designed to enhance market 
transparency. It utilises over 79,000 transaction data of the Aberdeen residential 
market for the period of Q2 1998 to Q2 2013 to test the models.
Findings: The empirical findings provide some novel insights in relation to the price 
determination within the residential market in Scotland. Our spatial lag models suggest 
that spatial autocorrelation in property prices has increased since the Home Report 
came into effect, indicating that property sellers have become more prone to infer 
asking prices based on prior sales of dwellings in close vicinity. The once-common 
practice of setting artificially low asking prices seems to have dwindled to a certain 
extent statistically. 
Originality: The importance of understanding the relationship between information 
transparency and property price determination has gathered momentum over the past 
decade. Although spatial hedonic techniques have been extensively used to study the 
impact of various property- and neighbourhood-specific attributes on residential real 
estate market in general, surprisingly little is known about the empirical relationship 
between spatial autocorrelation in real estate prices and information transparency.
1. Introduction
Pricing strategy has been an important concept in both theoretical and empirical modelling 
of housing transactions which is envisaged to impact upon the number of bids, final 
transaction price and the length of time to sell a home (Kang and Garnder, 1989; Yavas and 
Yang, 1995; Forgey et al., 1996; Arnold, 1999; Anglin et al., 2003; Pryce, 2011, Thanos and 
White, 2014). Equally, the evaluation of asking prices is also important in the valuation 
process, where estimated market value is derived from recently transacted comparable sale 
prices. As such, bias in the asking prices of comparable properties can distort the market value 
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estimate of the subject property, which in turn could lead to a divergence between the market 
value estimate and the sale price (Rabianski, 1992).
 It is widely accepted that there is a degree of information asymmetry in most housing 
markets between sellers and buyers. This occurs when sellers and their agents have better 
knowledge of a property’s qualities and location, whereas buyers are perceived to be less well 
informed (Lin and Vandell, 2007; Pope, 2008; Wong et al., 2012, Nanda and Ross, 2012). This 
effect of the improvement in information symmetry has been examined by a number of 
studies (for example, Pope, 2008; Nanda and Ross, 2012). Whilst numerous studies have 
investigated the impact of the introduction of property condition disclosure regulations on 
the selling prices, more limited analysis has been undertaken to examine the potential 
changes in the pricing strategy of the sellers.
In Scotland, the improvement in information transparency on housing transactions was also 
enforced by regulations. The Home Report scheme was introduced in December 2008,  
requiring the seller of a residential property to provide a Single Survey, an Energy Report, and 
a questionnaire when listing the property on the market. The Scottish government introduced 
the scheme with three main objectives: to improve information about a property’s condition, 
to address the cost and efficiency issue associated with multiple valuations and surveys, and 
to address the problems created by the practice of setting artificially low asking prices (Black 
et al. 2015). Indeed, this artificial setting of low asking prices1 has traditionally been common 
practice in Scotland, especially during periods of market upturns and sustained growth. This 
approach whilst benefitting sellers from the uncertainty and competition among potential 
buyers, has been heavily and publicly criticised for leading people, who cannot afford the 
property, paying for surveys to be undertaken. Consequently, to evaluate the extent to which 
the scheme met the initial objectives, the Scottish government carried out a five-year review 
in 2014.  The findings emanating from the review illustrated that, on first showing, the scheme 
appeared to be successful, nonetheless, when specifically addressing the issue relating to the 
1 The “asking price” in the “price over” (which is explained in section 2) context is not the reservation price that 
sellers would expect to achieve, or it is a ceiling price in many housing markets where buyers normally 
negotiate downward from an asking price.  It acts more like a “guide price”, which sends a signal to potential 
buyers that the seller is expecting to achieve a certain amount above of this price (Pryce, 2011).
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setting artificially low asking prices, the government’s review was far less conclusive on how 
much this is due to poorer market conditions. 
Accordingly, this paper attempts to complement the government review and provide some 
additional evidence as to the evaluation of potential changes in pricing strategy as a result of 
the implementation of the Home Report scheme. In this regard, we examine the potential 
changes in the relationship between asking and seller’s perceived reservation price and 
further explore the explanations for such changes using auction theories relative to the 
Scottish sealed bid context. Using housing transaction data pre and post the introduction of 
the Home Report, we empirically test whether there has been a significant statistical 
difference in asking price relative to the “value” of the property since the introduction of the 
scheme. It is believed that a better empirical understanding and conceptualisation of the 
underpinning price determination process and dynamics of the real estate market, as well as 
the effect of government policy on market transparency is of crucial significance from the 
viewpoints of buyers, sellers and other stakeholders. It is further posited that the study should 
carry implications in relation to the effectiveness of government interventions to tackle 
problems arising from information asymmetry in real estate pricing and enhance the overall 
equitability of the real estate investment environment for market participants.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the background of 
the Scottish housing market and the rationale for the enactment of the Home Report scheme. 
Section 3 explores the theories relative to pricing strategy in housing auctions with Section 4 
offering descriptions of the data used within the empirical analysis. Sections 5 and 6 explain 
the empirical modelling and provide a discussion of the empirical findings, with Section 7 
drawing conclusions. 
2. Background of the Scottish housing market
The Scottish housing market has some unique characteristics. The dominant selling 
mechanism is the “price over” system, where properties on the mark t are listed as “offers 
over” or “price over” an amount set. When there is more than one potential buyer, the seller 
sets a “closing date” on which, offers from all the bidders are submitted in the form of first 
price sealed bid auction, and the highest offer tends to be accepted2. Gibb (1992) suggests 
that through uncertainties and opportunities created by this sealed bid system, sellers can 
capture economic rent. This is also supported by game theory which indicates that sealed bid 
auctions favour sellers in a strong market where the number of potential bidders is relatively 
2 Sellers may also consider other conditions of the offer, such as proposed entry date.
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large, and bidders are likely to be “risk averse”3. However, this system could be viewed as an 
“unethical system” from a buyer’s perspective mainly because it leaves estate agents open to 
accusations of setting artificially low asking prices to create fictitious competition, leading 
people who cannot afford the property paying for surveys.  
In 2008, a new regulation - the Home Report was introduced to the Scottish housing market. 
By law, dwellings4 listed on the market from the 1st December 2008 are required to have a 
Home Report undertaken.  This report consists of a Single Survey, an energy report and a 
questionnaire. The Single Survey is a level 2 Homebuyers Survey and Valuation (HSV) 
equivalent survey5, which includes a valuation. It should be highlighted that many mortgage 
lenders accept this valuation as the collateral value of the property. Sellers are responsible 
for the cost of the home Report, and any potential buyer can access the report via selling 
agents and property solicitor centres free of charge.
The scheme was introduced with three overarching objectives. The government believed that 
the scheme would improve housing market stability by providing the essential information 
about the properties to the buyers. However,  this was met with concerns pertaining to the  
upfront cost of the scheme and also in relation to potential conflict of interests in the sense 
that “the surveyor must produce a report that will be used by both the seller and buyer, two 
parties that have opposing interests in the property transaction – particularly in regards to the 
valuation and the repair categories” (Black, et al. 2015:5).
The government’s five-year review of the scheme included both a public consultation6 and a 
research study7 where all three objectives of Home Report were evaluated. Whilst the public 
consultation found that the majority of the respondents considered the scheme to be an 
improvement, it did still highlight concerns regarding the setting of unrealistic asking prices. 
Indeed, the findings indicated that while the valuation helped prevent the occurrence of 
3 Bidders being risk averse refers to the fear of not being able to win the auction.
4 This includes all private properties listed in the market, excluding “right to buy” properties, and some of the 
new developments.
5According to Royal Institute of Charter Surveyors (RICS), level 2 HSV shows the condition of the property, and 
includes a market valuation and insurance rebuild costs. It also provides guidance to legal advisors and advice 
on defects that may affect the value of the property such as repairs, and ongoing maintenance.
6 Chartered surveyors, legal profession and estate agent respondents, local authorities, construction industry 
respondents, consumer, advice & campaign groups and property management, maintenance and conservation 
respondents were consulted.
7 The research study surveyed 928 households in Scotland.
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artificially low asking price (to a certain degree), it is less useful in doing so in a rising market 
(Robertson & Blair, 2014). That said, the research study also suggested that relatively poorer 
market conditions could also have contributed in addressing the issue of artificially low asking 
prices (Black, et al. 2015). Further, the findings of the government’s five-year review of the 
Home Report is based on both qualitative data and descriptive analysis. In this regard, it 
acknowledges but fails to control for the effect of changes in market conditions on pricing 
behaviours.  With the use of a rich set of market transaction data for a specific case study 
area, North East Scotland, this paper complements the government review by providing 
further quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of the policy objective in relation to price 
setting in the housing market.
Previous research has theoretically and empirically corroborated that the choice of real estate 
marketing system in a given locality is indeed primarily dependent on the degree of variation 
in buyer search cost as well as seller holding cost (Quan 2002), information asymmetries 
between the contracting parties and their respective levels of risk aversion (McAfee and 
McMillan, 1987). Alternative forms of real estate pricing arrangements exist in other regions 
of the U.K. and elsewhere with the fixed-price system being the most commonly adopted in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The fixed-price mechanism requires the seller to 
publicly disclose his reservation price whilst prospective buyers compete for the property on 
a first-come-first-serve basis. The fixed price essentially serves as a limit on the offers that the 
seller receives, which provides a greater degree of certainty for the willing buyers over the 
maximum price they will have to pay for the home (Buschbom et al., 2018). Gan (2013) 
attributes the adoption of the fixed price system to the loss-averse nature of the seller as 
choosing a fixed price virtually implies revealing a strong market signal to sell the property, 
particularly when the seller is under financial pressure to release capital tied up in the current 
property to, for example, buy another property. In the United States, residential property 
transactions are done mainly through direct negotiation whereby the seller and the 
prospective buyer have to bargain over the price in a series of offers and counter-offers. 
Usually, the process is conducted with the professional assistance of their property brokers 
or agents to reconciliate differences and reduce search cost and information asymmetries 
between the parties concerned.
3. Seller’s pricing strategy in the Scottish housing market
In most housing markets, asking prices are typically set by agreement between the seller and 
the acting agent. This is determined according to knowledge of the acquisition price, the costs 
of improvements and maintenance, housing attributes, and the selling prices of similar 
properties nearby. Selling agents have insightful local market knowledge and more 
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comprehensive information and data on recent transactions, based on which they advise their 
clients on a pricing strategy. As highlighted by Thanos and White (2014), asking prices are 
therefore set according to the strategic behaviour of sellers with private values, as well as a 
perception of the “common value” element in the market advised by selling agents – the 
“expert advice”. 
Search model analysis as proffered by Yavas and Yang (1995:366) argues that asking price 
serves as a signalling function “that maps the listing price to the seller’s valuation of the 
property”. This implies that a lower asking price signals that the seller might accept a lower 
price, therefore increases the probability of sale and increases the expected selling price 
through this channel (Horowitz 1992; Yavas & Yang, 1995; Pryce, 2011). However, in a market 
where the asking price serves as a ceiling price, a lower asking price also reduces the upper 
end of the potential bids distribution, thus reduces the expected sale price (Horowitz 1992; 
Yavas & Yang, 1995). Consequently, sellers in such markets often face a trade-off between 
the time on the market (selling quickly) and achieving a higher sales price. 
In the Scottish housing market, the “price over” asking price is not a ceiling price, the common 
“expert advice”, certainly prior to the introduction of the Home Report, was to set an asking 
price below that of the expected selling price to achieve a high price (Levin and Pryce, 2007). 
In a sense, the “price over” amount is equivalent to a starting price in a conventional auction. 
There are two conflicting theories regarding the influence of starting price in auctions. The 
first suggests that a low starting price reduces the barrier to an auction, therefore increases 
the number of potential bidders (Ariely and Simonson, 2003; Kamins et al., 2004; Simonson 
and Ariely, 2005). This auction theory suggests that the optimal bid from each bidder in a 
sealed price auction rises as the number of bidders increases under both the “private value” 
and “common value” models8, implying that a higher selling price is expected with greater 
number of bidders (Wilson, 1997; Laffont, 1996). Indeed, Ooi et al. (2006) illustrate such 
8 It is worth noting that auction theories tend to distinguish between two models that make assumptions on the 
information possessed by participants concerning the valuation of the auction subject in question, namely the 
“independent private value” and “common value” models. With the independent private value model, each 
bidder is assumed to have his own valuation and different realisations of the value of the auction subject 
(Paarsch and Hong, 2006). Knowing other bidders’ valuations will not change the bidder valuation. In a “common 
value” model, the actual value is the same for all bidders. Bulow and Klemperer (2002) suggest that a house’s 
value has both elements, but due to complicity, housing auctions are normally modelled under either value. 
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relationships in a theoretical model based on “private value”, and also provide empirical 
evidence that supports the theoretical analysis using sealed price auction data on land 
transactions in Singapore. Equally, research undertaken by Levin and Pryce (2007) employed 
a simulation model based on a hypothetical database of 30,000 house valuations in the 
Scottish “price over” system. Their results found that the probability of extreme bids (high 
selling price) increased from over 5% to 18% when the number of bidders rises from 1 to 4. 
This confirms that the setting of low asking prices to attract bidders in the Scottish offers over 
system therefore seems to be a logical strategy.
Arguably, the winning bid is also influenced by bidders’ risk aversion, in a sealed bid 
environment. Risk aversion does not alter bidder’s behaviour in an open auction, because 
they, in theory, will stop bidding if the reservation price is reached9. However, in a sealed 
auction, a risk averse bidder (who has the fear of losing) may also be willing to pay a premium 
– in the form of a higher bid – for the insurance of winning (Maskin and Riley, 1985)10. As 
Pryce (2011) contends, this provides an explanation for the supposed popularity of the offers 
over system during market upswings, as buyers are more “desperate” to buy: dwellings are 
selling relatively fast, and buyers face higher opportunity costs to viewing as the probability 
of viewed dwellings being sold to other buyers increase. By setting low asking price, the seller 
increases the probability of viewings, thereby increases the probability of a viewer submitting 
a bid due to the risk of not finding a better alternative during his search period.
An alternative theory regarding starting price is that the initial price represents what Tversky 
and Kahenamn (1974) describe as an anchor. More specifically, a low starting price would 
indicate a low value and result in fewer bidders and a low(e ) winning bid (Ariely and 
Simonson. 2003). Empirical studies examining this concept have tended to find mixed effects 
of starting price on the final winning bid in online English auctions (Ariely and Simonson, 2003; 
Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007). However, there has been limited analysis of starting price in 
sealed bid real estate auctions. It is important to note that the influence of st rting price on 
the final selling price in an auction is likely to diminish if salient reference prices are available 
(Ariely and Simonson, 2003). For example, if consumers have a well-established reference 
price for an auctioned subject, the starting price may have relatively small effect on the final 
9 Ignoring irrational exuberance.
10 see Maskin and Riley, 1985 for a full discussion of their theoretical model for this argument.
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price. This may explain the rationale of using methods such as those adopted in the Home 
Report to address the problems associated with the setting of artificially low asking prices. 
The fundamental change with the scheme is that the Home Report Valuation acts as a “price 
marker” for buyers and is often used in negotiation over price (Black et al., 2015). Since the 
valuation serves as the reference price, it is more likely to serve the “signalling function” of 
seller’s reservation price. Importantly, it also indicates the collateral value for mortgage 
purposes, therefore reduces the level of uncertainty for the buyers.  With all these respects, 
the valuation is likely to determine the potential bids distribution, and there is less incentive 
for the sellers to set an asking price that derives hugely from the valuation. Arguably, the 
effect of the Home Report scheme is that the “price over” asking price has become more 
correlated to valuations, which are normally obtained through the comparable method using 
market transactions of recently sold nearby properties. 
Based on the discussion above, we posit, firstly, that spatial autocorrelation in asking prices 
to selling price of properties in proximity should have increased since the implementation of 
the Home report as property prices are determined, to a large degree, on the basis of values 
of nearby properties. Empirically testing this proposition serves to establish whether the 
Home Report has achieved its objectives in relation to market transparency on one hand and 
inform future policy decisions on the other. Secondly, along the same line of logic, it is 
surmised that the Home Report should have reduced the difference between the asking price 
and the underlying value of the subject property given an increased level of transparency in 
the property price discovery process. The degree of such price deviation, we conjecture, 
should be dependent to the neighbourhood characteristic as well as property-level attributes. 
Therefore, this paper sets out to test the following three hypotheses in relation to the 
determination of asking prices of properties in Scotland:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): since the introduction of the Home Report, spatial autocorrelation in 
asking prices to selling price of nearby properties has become more pronounced; and
Hypothesis 2 (H2): the introduction of the Home Report has reduced the deviation of asking 
price from the underlying value of the property.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): the degree of deviation of asking price from the value of the property is 
determined by neighbourhood and property attributes.
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By testing the above three hypotheses with market transactions data pre- and post- 
introduction of the Scheme, we should be able to empirically corroborate whether, and to 
what extent, the Home Report Scheme has achieved its stated objectives, and whether the 
property market has become more informationally efficient in terms of pricing. 
4. Data
Transaction data on private residential properties from Aberdeen Solicitors Property Centre 
(ASPC)11 was obtained on the basis of the non-disclosure agreement between University of 
Aberdeen and ASPC.  The dataset covers the housing market in Aberdeen and Aberdeenshire 
(Figure 1)12, and contains information on the physical attributes of the property, information 
on asking and selling prices, listing dates, transaction dates, and the method of sales. 
[insert figure 1 here]
While the dataset commences in 1984, this study focuses on the time period between the 
second quarter of 1998 and the second quarter of 2013. This is due to the availability of 
geographical coordinates that are used in the analysis. In total, there are 79,648 observations 
in the data from (Q2 1998 to Q2 2013), 90% of which are successful transactions, with less 
than 10% of these properties withdrawn from ASPC without being sold. In total, 70,642 
observations are used in the empirical modelling stage (Section 5), due to missing and 
incomplete variables. Table 1 provides a summary of the variables included in the empirical 
analysis and their descriptions.
[insert Table 1]
During the time period, over 82% of the properties in the dataset were marketed as “price 
over”, whereas “fixed price” dominates the remaining 18% of the sample. The proportion of 
properties marketed as “price over” varies according to market conditions, ranging from 60% 
in the late 1990s to over 90% in mid 2000s. Following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the 
market witnessed a reduction of properties marketed as “price over”, however the popularity 
11 ASPC was the first Solicitors Property Centre established in the UK, and serves as a central marketing place for 
residential properties and small commercial properties in the region. Approximately 90% of private residential 
properties in North East Scotland are marketed through ASPC.
12 The map of Aberdeen Housing Market defined by local authorities is presented in Figure 1, it covers Aberdeen 
city local authority jurisdiction as well the commuting towns in Aberdeenshire.
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of this selling mechanism started to increase again in 2010, symbolic of the start of the market 
recovery phase. By 2013, 87% of properties in Aberdeen were marketed as “price over”.
Since the valuations of the properties are not available in the dataset13, a limitation of the 
research is that we cannot directly observe how asking price is set relative to the valuation of 
the market. The asking-selling price spread - “price premium”, is calculated as a percentage 
difference between the transaction price and the asking price14 for each quarter for both 
“price over” transactions and “fixed price” transactions. Figure 2 shows the average deflated 
house price with reference to the right hand side vertical axis, the average price premium for 
“price over” transactions and “fixed price” transactions with reference to the left hand side 
vertical axis during the time period. The average house price is affected by both national and 
local oil and gas dominated economic conditions. 
[insert figure 2 here]
It is evident that fluctuations in “price over” premiums are much more pronounced in the 
time series, with an average of around 6% observed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and 
over 40% in the second quarter of 2007. These changes undoubtedly reflect the market 
upturn witnessed across most, if not all, advanced economies caused by financialisation and 
macroeconomic conditions. Notably, the very large premiums between 2006 and early 2008 
are not due to a few extreme values in the sample. This is in line with the explanations on 
market conditions’ influence on pricing strategy discussed in the previous section. 
The signs of subprime mortgage crisis started in the second quarter of 2007, during which 
time, both house prices and offers over premiums peaked. The decreases of average house 
price commenced from Q3 2007, which was accompanied by a decline in price premiums. 
Nevertheless, “price over” premiums were still relatively large throughout the first three 
quarters of 2008. Notably, the first quarter of 2009, shortly after the introduction of the Home 
Report with observed price premiums for “price over” transactions reducing significantly to 
below 5% on average. Although the average house price also experienced a decrease 
simultaneously, the price decline was relatively insignificant. The average price premium for 
13 Before the introduction of the Home Report, valuations are instructed by buyers, and often multiple 
valuations were carried for the same properties by different buyers, such information was not recorded by  
ASPC. 
14 Price premium = (sold price – asking price) / asking price





























































International Journal of Housing M
arkets and Analysis
11
properties sold as “fixed price” on the other hand shows much less variation throughout the 
property cycle. Indeed, Figure 1 suggests that although market conditions play an important 
role in determining “price over” premiums, given the relatively high average price in 
Aberdeen post-GFC, there may be other forces that fundamentally changed the way in which 
the “price over” mechanism works. 
5. Methodology and development of empirical models
Since the seminal work of Rosen (1974), there has been a broad consensus in the real estate 
literature that the hedonic valuation method provides a reliable and robust analytical 
environment to model property prices. The model is designed to predict or explain property 
market value using equations that accounts for variation in historical transaction prices as a 
function of different housing attributes. Nonetheless, the traditional hedonic approach does 
not explicitly take the locations and/or other spatial characteristics of the dwellings into 
consideration, which often results in inefficient estimation and biased inference due to the 
presence of spatially autocorrelated errors (Dubin et al., 1999). In light of this, the spatial lag 
hedonic valuation method (SLM) developed by Can (1992 and 1997) is utilised in this study to 
ascertain the degree of impact of the Home Report on property prices in Scotland. Generally 
speaking, a spatial lag model assumes that the transaction price of a dwelling at any given 
point in time can be expressed as a function of not only its structural attributes and the quality 
of the neighbourhood but also price effects from prior transactions within its close proximity. 
Hence, there should be a functional inter-relationship between the sales price of the subject 
dwelling and the prior transaction prices of other dwellings within its neighbourhood. In 
practice, these price effects are acknowledged and injected by the traders and valuers in the 
property market through “the comparable-sales” valuation method to estimate real estate 
prices (Can (1997) and Wong et al. (2013)). Indeed, spatial lag hedonic modelling techniques 
have been extensively employed in the literature to investigate real estate issues and 
problems. Examples include Kim et al. (2003) and McCord et al. (2018) who examine the 
relationship between residential property market and air pollution; McCord et al. (2019) who 
confirms an empirical linkage between energy performance certificate and property value; 
Haider and Miller (2000) who explores the effect of transportation infrastructure on 
residential property prices; Li and Joh (2016) who studies the synergistic economic benefit of 
enhancing bikeability and public transit accessibility with respect to real estate prices in an 
urban setting; and more recently, Barreca et al. (2020) who assesses how the real estate 
market is influenced by the level of urban vibrancy. In the following sub-sections, we develop 
a number of spatial lag hedonic models to test the hypotheses formulated in Section 3. 

































































To test H1, we start with the following hedonic equation:
 …… (Equation 1)   𝑙𝑛Pi,t = c + ∑
K
k = 1βkSk +δ∑
n
k = 1Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h +ε
                                                                  𝑤𝑖𝑡h 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
where  is the asking price of property  at time ;  is a constant term;  is a bundle of 𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 𝑖 𝑡 𝑐 𝑆𝑘
structural characteristics of the subject property  described in Table 1.  is the implicit price  βk
for the corresponding . Since it is conjectured that sellers also use evidence of recently sold 𝑆𝑘
nearby properties when they set asking price, asking price is therefore expected to correlate 
with nearby properties transaction prices. To account for such pricing behaviour, a 
spatiotemporal term  is included in the equation.  is the actual ∑nk = 1Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h Pj,t ― h
transaction price of property  at time t-h, with 15,  is a spatial weight that 𝑗 ℎ = 2 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑊𝑖,𝑗
reflects the degree as well as the structure of spatial proximity between properties and .  𝑖 𝑗
Mathematically,  can take one of the following forms:𝑊𝑖,𝑗
 ……(Equation 1.1)Wi, j =
1
di, j 
 ……(Equation 1.2)Wi, j =
1
𝑑2𝑖,𝑗 
 ……(Equation 1.3)Wi, j =
1
𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑗 
where  denotes the Euclidean distance measured in meter between property  and ; is 𝑑𝑖, 𝑗 𝑖 𝑗 Wi,j 
so constructed since it is reasonable to assume that sellers would place heavier weight on 
more proximate properties in setting property price. The most typical measures (see Cliff and 
Ord, 1981, Basu, 1998 and Dublin, 1998) include inverse distances (Equation 1.1), inverse 
distances raised to some power (in Equation 1.2, we use distance-squared), and inverse 
exponential distance (Equation 1.3). Moreover, given that , the spatial ∑nk = 1𝑊𝑖, 𝑗 = 1
autoregressive term  suggests a weighted average of spatially lagged price 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗,𝑡 ― ℎ
information. The parameter  therefore can indicate the degree to which sellers extract price  𝛿
15 We also used longer periods, and two months lag produced the highest spatial correlation coefficient.
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information from prior sales to ascertain asking prices, and hence H1 can be tested. If past 
information is relevant and applicable,  should be non-zero and statistically significant. In 𝛿
other words, housing prices are spatially auto-correlated. Finally,  is an error term that εi,t
measures the effects stemming from missing variables, misspecification of the model, 
measurement errors and inadequate sampling. This specification essentially assumes a linear 
functional form and fixed parameters. 
It must also be highlighted that while neighbourhood attributes are commonly employed and 
explicitly measured in a typical hedonic model, they are intentionally left out in our analysis. 
We surmise that the inclusion of  can indeed capture a set of neighborhood Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h
features pertaining to the socioeconomic and physical make-up of the neighbourhood and 
accessibility to various urban services and amenities. In addition, variables that are normally 
used to control for market conditions are not included in Equation (1) for the same reason. 
The omission of such variables should thus avoid potential statistical nuisances associated 
with over-specification of our models.
In addition to the spatial autoregressive variable, a dummy variable, , is included 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛
in the hedonic equation to explicitly discern properties that are withdrawn from the market 
after listing. Modifications of the equation yields Equation (2) below:








βkSk + λ𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛 + ε
…...(Equation 2)
where  takes the value 1 if the property is withdrawn from the market, and 0 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛
otherwise; and  is coefficients to be estimated. It is expected that overpriced properties are λ
more likely to experience difficulties to sell, some of which may even be withdrawn from the 
market.
To test H1, which is deduced from the proposition that sellers have become more prone to 
infer asking prices based on actual prices of nearby recently transacted properties since the 
introduction of the Home Report Scheme, thereby increasing the spatial autocorrelation in 
the property prices, Equation (2) is thus modified by including a dummy variable, . 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
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The variable is designed to interact with .  has a value of 1 if the Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
observation occurs on or after 1st December 2008, and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, we develop 
Equation (3) as follows:












βkSk + λ𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛 + ε
 …… (Equation 3)                                                                    𝑤𝑖𝑡h 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
The coefficient of   is expected to be positive and statistically significant, if sellers have ρ
indeed given more weight to nearby transactions when they set asking prices for the subject 
properties since the introduction of the Home Report. In other words, we should observe a 
stronger spatial autocorrelation between asking prices and nearby transaction prices after 
the scheme came into effect.
Testing H2
The second hypothesis formulated in this paper tests whether there is a reduction in deviation 
between asking price and the “value” of the property after the implementation of the scheme. 
More specifically, it tests whether potential house sellers are less inclined to market their 
properties by setting an unrealistically low asking price relative to the properties’ potential 
market value after December 2008. To measure the degree of such pricing deviation,  16 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
is used:
    …… (Equation 4)𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖 =
𝑃𝐴𝑖
𝑃𝐸𝑖
where   is the actual asking price of property , and  is the estimated value of the property 𝑃𝐴𝑖 𝑖 𝑃𝐸𝑖
obtained from the following equation:









 …… (Equation 5)𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
Where  is the sale price of property  at time .  is the fitted value of   for each P′i, t  𝑖 𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑖 P′i, t
dwelling obtained by estimating Equation (5). 
16 This follows the concept of degree of overpricing in Kang and Garder (1989); Yavas and Yang (1995); Donald 
et al (1996); Anglin et al (2003); and Pryce (2011). Seller’s pricing strategy is presented by an asking price 
relative to the value of the property.
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We further posit that  is a function of the structural variable , since sellers are Devi,t Sk
expected to have better knowledge of the quality of the property, and their pricing strategy 
should reflect this accordingly. Pryce (2011) argues that the asking-selling price spread is likely 
to contain a locational convention  (i.e. neighbourhoods may have implicit conventions on 𝛾 ∗𝑘
asking-selling price spread). However,  is not directly observable in the dataset, we 𝛾 ∗𝑘
therefore use the standard deviation of the actual asking-selling price spread  within the 𝜎𝑖,𝑘
neighbourhood  as a proxy for the locational convention:𝑘
…… (Equation 6)𝜎𝑖, 𝑘 = 𝑆𝐷(𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑘)
Neighbourhood is defined as a 3-kilometre radius circle17 centred at property . In addition, 𝑘  𝑖
we only consider transactions that occur within the past two months prior to the sale of 
property  when computing . One would expect that within a neighbourhood , if the 𝑖 𝜎𝑖,𝑘 𝑘
standard deviation of asking-selling price spread is small, there is likely to be a “locational 𝜎𝛾𝑖𝑘 
convention”. On the other hand, if the variation in the asking-selling price spread is large, the 
evidence of locational convention  should be less apparent. To test this, Equation (7) is 𝛾 ∗𝑘
constructed.  is expected to have a significant effect on  and  should be negative 𝜎𝑖, 𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝜔
and statistically significant. Furthermore, it has been established that market conditions also 
play an important role in price setting (Pryce, 2011), hence, we posit that ,  a time dummy 𝑇
variable (with a coefficient   to be estimated) measured on a monthly basis, should affect φ
:𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
=  …… (Equation 7)𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 c + ∑
K
k = 1βkSk +𝜔𝜎𝑖, 𝑘 + φT + ε
Lastly,   is added to Equation (8) to test H2. We believe that the Home Report should 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
have a market-wide impact on how sellers set their initial prices. In particular, the practice of 
setting artificially low asking prices to draw more potential house buyers to bid will cease to 
a large extent. Accordingly, we re-write Equation (7) as follows:
= Ω  …… (Equation 8)𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 c + 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008 + ∑
K
k = 1βkSk +𝜔𝜎𝑖, 𝑘 + φT +ε
 is expected to be positive and statistically significant.Ω
We estimate the equations using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods. Our models are 
designed in such a way that only past events can exert influence on current events but not 
vice versa. This can largely avoid statistical inference problems such as endogeneitiy in the 
spatial lag terms. Provided that the error terms of the equations are independent and 
identically distributed, the OLS estimator will be asymptotically efficient and consistent. The 
summary statistics of the variables are shown in Table 2. 
17 The choice of the size of neighbourhood k is not arbitrarily determined. Indeed, the size of Aberdeen city 
(including Old Aberdeen) is roughly equal to that of a 3-km radius circle. 
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[Insert Table 2 here]
6. Regression results and discussions
Results for H1
Table 3 presents the regression results for Equation (1) to (3) using the three specifications of 
spatial weight respectively. The p-value for each variable is given in brackets. The last three 
rows of the table display the R-squared, adjusted R-squared and F-statistics of the models. 
[Insert Tables 3  here]
Most coefficients estimated using Equation (1) in all three measures of spatial weight show 
the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. For example, sellers are 
prone to demand a higher price for qualities such as extra bedrooms, public rooms, 
bathrooms, central heating, garage(s), double glazing, and cloak room (WC). New properties 
also tend to fetch have a higher asking price. Dummy variable  yields negative 𝐺𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛
coefficients with all three spatial weighting specifications, which seems to be counter-
intuitive. However, these coefficients became statistically insignificant once the variables on 
selling mechanisms and withdrawn properties are specified. Overall, the results on the 
property-specific variables are in agreement with those in the hedonic literature (e.g. Can 
(1992) and McCord et al. (2018))
In regard to testing H1, which states that asking prices are assumed to be spatially linked to 
prices of nearby properties sold within the previous two months. We observe that the 
coefficients of the spatial lag term, , are 0.0339, 0.1599, and 0.1131 respectively under that  δ
three different spatial specifications, and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
confirms our view that the housing prices are spatially auto-correlated. Of significance is the 
positive sign of the coefficient, which implies that house prices seem to move in tandem with 
one another: a higher (lower) price of a neighbouring property will generally result in a higher 
(lower) asking price of the subject property. Indeed, the findings echo Can (1997), which 
reveals spatial spillover/adjacency effect of absolute property prices arising from prior sales 
within an immediate neighbourhood via a practice of “comparable-sales”.  Interestingly, the 
effect of  are very different across the three specifications with the size the Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h
magnitude of the variable appearing to be larger when non-liner measures (as in Equation 1.2 
and Equation 1.3) are employed. In sum, the models achieve an explanatory power of around 
50%.
As a modification of Equation (1), Equation (2) is designed to examine how properties that 
are withdrawn from the market are priced differently by the sellers. The coefficients on 
Withdrawn, significant at the 1% level, range from 0.1390 to 0.1769 across the three spatial 
weight specifications, suggesting that this category of properties tend to be priced 15%-19% 
higher than the others, ceteris paribus. We surmise the fact that the properties are overpriced 
relative to other properties on the market could be a reason why they are withdrawn.
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Equation (3) incorporates an interaction term, , to the model, which is  𝐷𝑒𝑐2008 × Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h
designed to examine whether property sellers rely more on prior sales from the 
neighbourhood in ascertaining asking prices after the inception of the Home Report scheme. 
We find that the coefficients on the interaction term with all three specifications are around 
0.05 and significant at the 1% level. This confirms our belief that after December 2008, asking 
prices are more spatially dependent on nearby sale prices by virtue of the price discovery 
process of the sellers given a more informationally efficient housing market. Hence, the Home 
Report might have increased the overall transparency of the market.
Results for H2
Equation (7) is formulated to investigate the determinants of pricing strategy, which is 
measured as the asking price relative to the estimated value derived from our hedonic model. 
Equation (8) further incorporates a dummy variable that indicates represents the introduction 
of the Home Report to test H2. Table 4 depicts the regressions results for H2 under the three 
spatial weighting specifications. 
[insert Table 4]
Examining the results for Equation (7), locational convention measure  yields negative and 𝜎𝑖, 𝑘
significant coefficients with Equation (1.2) and (1.3) specifications. This is in line with our 
expectation that in a neighbourhood where there is a higher variation in the asking-selling 
price spread, the effect of locational convention should be less apparent with sellers being  
more likely to set asking prices that diverge more from the underlying values. The results also 
reveal that some housing attributes exhibit statistically significant effect on the dependent 
variable, suggesting that sellers do consider certain housing attributes such as number of 
bedrooms and heating systems when pricing their properties.
Lastly,  is incorporated to Equation (8) to test H2. Its coefficient is 0.0523, 0.0274, 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
0.0397 under the three spatial weight specifications (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3) respectively. In all 
three cases, the coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Mathematically, it can be 
interpreted that there is a reduction in asking price valuation deviation. More precisely 
specifically, the ratio between asking price and the value of the property is 3%-5% closer to 
1. This suggests that the marketing strategies employed to set unrealistically low asking prices 
by the sellers have become less evidenced since the introduction of the Home Report scheme, 
however, the magnitude of such effect is relatively small. 
In terms of R-squared and adjusted R-squared, our models achieve an explanatory power of 
around 40% for all the three spatial weight specifications. The estimation is marginally 
improved when location convention measure is taken into consideration. One might argue 
that the relatively low R-square could undermine the validity of the findings of the study. 
However, the main emphasis of this paper is on whether the Scheme affects the way sellers 
determine asking prices, not on the discovery of various determinants of valuation deviation 
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of real estate price formation. Therefore, it should be highlighted that only the improvement 
of R-square, as well as the signs and statistical significance of the variables of interest in the 
models that are of crucial relevance to our research.
As a robustness test, we generate Equation (9) by discarding all statistically insignificant 
structural variables with p-value below 1% in Equation (8). It is shown that the results are 
highly consistent with those of the other models. For instance, the model using as 1/𝑑𝑖, 𝑗
spatial weight (with Floor and the property type variables removed) suggests a reduced level 
of asking price deviation post-2008, given that the coefficient on  is positive and 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
statistically significant at the 1% level. The model produces an adjusted R-squared of 0.4431, 
which is comparable to that of the original model. Similar findings are observed in the model 
using the spatial specification of inverse exponential distances (with Garden, Floor and the 
property type variables discarded) in terms of the signs and statistical significance of  𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
and other hedonic attributes.
7. Concluding Remarks
Understanding the underlying price determination process and dynamics of real estate is 
important from the viewpoints of buyers, sellers and other stakeholders, especially in a 
market that is characterised by information inefficiency, a diverse composition of market 
players as well as heterogeneity of quality of housing. This study aims to empirically evaluate 
the effectiveness of the Home Report Scheme introduced and implemented in Scotland in 
2008, which was designed to improve information efficiency about property condition as well 
as address the often-criticized malpractice of setting artificially low list prices by property 
sellers. To achieve this, This paper investigates how property sellers determine asking prices 
in response to a change in government policy in an information search context with the use 
of a large number of real estate transactions in the North East of Scotland. By subjecting the 
analysis in an information search context and in a hedonic setting that explicitly incorporates 
a spatial process of price discovery using spatial lag modelling techniques and controls for a 
large number of housing attributes (i.e. to test H1), we find strong prima facie evidence that 
property sellers have become more prone to rely on prior sales to establish asking prices since 
the introduction of a new government policy, namely the Home Report , as indicated by an 
elevated level of spatial autocorrelation in the sample house prices across all statistical 
models examined. The once-common practice of setting artificially low asking price with the 
aim to attract buyers seems to have dwindled to a certain extent. In other words, after the 
Scheme came into effect introduction of the Scheme, real estate sellers seem to have set 
prices on a basis that is more closely in line with the general market conditio s and the 
underlying value of property. The results of testing H2 in our analysis, which compares price 
divergence pre- and post- 2008 2018, further confirms this conjecture. More specifically, our 
statistical models reveal that the accuracy of property pricing has, on average, improved by a 
factor of 3 - 5% after the implementation of the Scheme.
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A major learning outcome of this study is to provide robust evidence-based justifications for 
necessary government interventions to help address issues associated with market failures 
stemming from information asymmetry between buyers and sellers within a property market. 
Prior to the introduction of the Home Report, problems concerning the propensity of property 
sellers in Scotland artificially lowering initial asking prices were rife, placing potential buyers 
in a relatively weaker bargaining position. Indeed, an early investigation by Akerlof (1970) 
suggests that information asymmetry, which deters market participants from making 
mutually advantageous trade in a free enterprise economy, is particularly more widespread 
in markets dominated by second-hand assets such as direct real estate. This is due to the fact 
that sellers of second-hand homes are better informed about the quality of the dwellings than 
the buyers, and consequently creating an unlevel playing field when it comes to pricing. Our 
empirical results support the view that government should play a more active role in 
facilitating transactions in the real estate market by putting forward measures that counteract 
such information asymmetry in property pricing, ensuring a higher degree of market 
transparency which could result in enhanced market information efficiency and equitability 
that benefit not only the market players but also the society at large.
From a methodological stance, this study demonstrates how housing policies can be 
empirically evaluated and scrutinised in the framework of spatial hedonic price modelling, 
which is one of the greatest departures from the mainstream real estate literature.  Existing 
approaches to examining institutional arrangements of housing market have been 
predominately normative or descriptive in nature, often producing elusive and subjective 
explanations, conclusions and implications that cannot be hypothesised and/or validated with 
empirical data. We believe that the findings and the methodology of the study yield both 
theoretical and practical insights into real estate price formation and modelling, which are of 
great use and interest to various categories of property stakeholders. For instance, the 
hedonic models developed in the paper demonstrate that a parsimonious model with a high 
degree of explanatory power could be achieved by accounting for spatially lagged pricing 
information through incorporating a spatial autoregressive process that reduces the number 
of housing attributes to be considered in the analysis, providing a justification for adopting a 
simple yet reliable valuation approach to conducting mass property appraisals for valuers, 
policy makers and other property professionals. From the perspective of property investors 
and property developers, the results in relation to property price deviation in Scotland 
presented in the study provides evidence-based explanations on how real estate prices could 
respond to government interference dynamically vis-a-vis the changing levels of the overall 
market transparency and information asymmetry resulting from the implementation of a new 
housing policy, which should bear implications for formulating arbitrage and trading 
strategies in real estate investment, as well as conducting policy evaluation in the arena of 
public services delivery. 
Last but not least, we acknowledge that the scope of the current study is somewhat limited 
in terms of the amount of data explored, which only covers a cross section of the entire 
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Scottish residential property market. We therefore contend that the current study could be 
further extended to incorporate comparison with other cities in the U.K. and elsewhere where 
different institutional arrangements in property pricing and marketing are in place.
 Last but not least, we believe that the findings of the study yield both theoretical and practical 
insights into real estate price formation, which are of great use and interest to policymakers, 
real estate developers, individual homebuyers, financial institutions and property 
professionals. 
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Figure 1. Housing market areas of Aberdeen city and Aberdeenshire.
Source: Aberdeen City Council
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Figure 2, Asking-selling price premiums and average real house price in Aberdeen 
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Table 1: descriptions of variables:
Variable Description/Type
Heating type (Heating) 1 if property has central heating, =0  if property has no heating or 
any other form of heating
Double Glazed 1 if property has double glazing, otherwise =0
Garden 1 if property has garden(s), otherwise =0 
Floor Number of floor stories within the dwelling: 1 for flat and 
bungalows, 2 or more for multi-storey houses
Bathroom Number of bathrooms.
Bedroom Number of bedrooms
WC Number of separate toilets/cloak rooms
Public Number of public rooms, including kitchen, lounge, conservatory, 
play room, etc.
𝐷𝑒𝑐2008 1 if property was listed on and after December 1st 2008, otherwise 
=0
Garage If a property has a garage(s)
New 1 if property is a new build, otherwise =0
Withdrawn 1 if property was withdrawn from the market, otherwise=0
Type D 1 if dwelling is detached property, otherwise=0
Type F 1 if dwelling is a flat, otherwise=0
Type N 1 if dwelling is non-detached property, otherwise=0
Dev Ratio: the deviation between asking price and the “value” of the 
property after the implementation of the scheme.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the main variables
Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pi,t GBP£ 131 239 107 836 9000 3500000
𝑉𝑖,𝑡 GBP£ 134 097 106 729 24077 6002596
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 Ratio 0.9999 0.0244 0.8320 1.3730
𝑆𝐷(𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑘) --- 0.2761 0.0022 0.2017 0.3183
Heating Dummy Var. 0.8128 0.3900 0 1
DoubleGlazed Dummy Var. 0.8778 0.3274 0 1
Garden Dummy Var. 0.5971 0.4904 0 1
Floor Number 1.4585 0.5596 1 6
Bathroom Number 0.9165 0.3599 0 4
Bedroom Number 2.3297 1.1398 0 9
Garage Number 0.3637 0.6038 0 8
WC Number 0.1630 0.3784 0 3
Public Number 1.4747 0.8033 0 14
𝐷𝑒𝑐2008 Dummy Var. 0.2450 0.4301 0 1
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Table 3: Regression results for Equations 1 to 3 
Dependent 
Variable
𝐏𝐢,𝐭       𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭
Spatial Weight 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋
Independent 
Variables
Eqn 1 Eqn 2 Eqn 3 Eqn 1 Eqn 2 Eqn 3 Eqn 1 Eqn 2 Eqn 3














































































































































































































































































Included Obs. 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642
𝑅2 0.5085 0.5218 0.6600 0.5293 0.5476 0.6759 0.5229 0.5399 0.6720
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅2 0.5084 0.5217 0.6599 0.5292 0.5475 0.6759 0.5228 0.5398 0.6719
Prob (F Stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: p-values are in brackets
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Table 4: Regression results for Equations 7 to 9
Dependent 
Variable
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
Spatial Weight 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 𝟏/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋
Independent 
Variables


















































































































































































































































Included Obs. 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070
𝑅2 0.4435 0.4449 0.4446 0.3946 0.3950 0.3945 0.4005 0.4013 0.4009
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅2 0.4420 0.4434 0.4431 0.3930 0.3934 0.3930 0.3988 0.3997 0.3994
Prob (F Stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: p-values are in brackets
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Comment 1: To make the manuscript more appealing to readers ‘outside’ the 
Scottish housing market, I think the authors should add some text to compare the Scottish 
system with the systems implemented in other countries. Then the reader can have a better 
understanding of the issue investigated from a broader perspective. This comparison could 
be added to close Section 2.
We totally agree with the reviewer’s Comment 1. We have therefore included one long 
paragraph in Section 2 to describe and explain various pricing systems adopted elsewhere 
(e.g. England, Wales, Northern Ireland and the U.S.) 
Comment 2: The authors should better emphasise in the introduction the importance of the 
topic that they are investigating. What is the value added/which are the lessons learnt from 
this piece of research that other researchers analysing housing markets in other countries 
could apply? For the manuscript to have a high impact it is important not to present the 
issue as something important at ‘local’ scale, it is much better to place it in a more broader 
context so that the advantages of the system or the lesson learnt from the research can be 
inspiring for others. I think it is important to firstly tackle this in the introduction (in a brief 
manner); and then pick up the issue again in the concluding part (focusing on the value 
added for policy-makers, for other agents operating in the housing market, etc?
We thank you for the reviewer’s comments. We have amended the text in the manner 
suggested by the reviewer (please see the second last paragraph of Section 1 and the 
second last paragraph of Section 7) to elucidate the importance of the topic. 
Comment 3: The second paragraph of Section 3 is interesting although I am missing 
examples of housing markets (at country/regional level) to illustrate the different 
types of housing markets that are described here.
We have added a footnote (footnote 8) to provide some geographic examples showing the 
empirical relationship between asking price and market signals in the literature. 
Comment 4: On page 6 line 56, please, add a reference to support the statement on the 
collateral value.
We have added one reference (Wyman et al., 2011)  to address the reviewer’s question in 
relation to “collateral value” . 
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Comment 5: On page 11 line 19, please, add a reference to direct the reader to some 
literature on hedonic prices.
We have included Can’s papers (on hedonic spatial lag modelling). 
Comment 6: The discussion of the results should be expanded for a better linkage with the 
existing body of work on the topic.
We thank you for the review’s comment which we think is extremely useful. The discussion 
has been substantially expanded in a manner that provides a better connection with the 
existing literature. For example, the results are compared to the works of Can (1992), Can and 
Megbolugbe (1997), McCord et al. (2018) who also observed spatial adjacency/ 
autocorrelation effects in the housing markets they investigated. 
Comment 7: The statement ‘Last but not least, we believe that the findings of the study yield 
both theoretical and practical insights into real estate price formation, which are of great use 
and interest to policymakers, real estate developers, individual homebuyers, financial 
institutions and property professionals’ is very important. Nevertheless, I think it would be 
good to see a concrete explanation of the ‘great use’ that each group (policy-makers, 
homebuyers, etc.) could do.
We very much agree with the reviewer’s comment. We have therefore provided some 
specific examples/explanations in relation to how the results of the study could be useful to 
different groups of real estate stakeholders.
Comment 8: How could the lessons learnt from this paper be applied/related to the 
development of bubbles in the housing market? I think that covering this would 
be of interest for many readers.
We are of the view that “the development of bubbles in the housing market” is beyond the 
scope of our study, given that we did not really study/ empirical test the relationship 
between the underlying economic fundamentals (such as demand and supply factors) and 
actual property transaction prices. We believe that it would be necessary to look at the 
underlying macroeconomic fundamentals over a long period of time before we could make 
any judgements as to whether the market is in a bubble.  We would like to point out that the 
main objective of our paper is on studying the formation of asking price, not on final sale 
price. Simply looking at (average) asking prices of the dwellings we examined does not 
permit us to make any reliable inference about housing bubbles (if any). 
Additional Questions:
1. Originality:  Does the paper contain new and significant information adequate to justify 
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publication? (i.e. is it a contribution to knowledge?): The topic is important. However, there is 
a strong local focus (the paper only refers to Scottland) which make it original, while at the 
same time could be of less interest for other researcher investigating markets outside the UK. 
This could be corrected while appropriately linking the findings to a broader context.
2. Relationship to Literature:  Does the paper demonstrate an adequate understanding of the 
relevant literature in the field and cite an appropriate range of literature sources?  Is any 
significant work ignored to your knowledge?: I think it is 'average'. I am asking for additional 
references in my report.
3. Methodology:  Is the paper's argument built on an appropriate base of theory, concepts, 
or other ideas?  Has the research or equivalent intellectual work on which the paper is based 
been well designed?  Are the research methods employed appropriate?: Yes.
4. Results:  Are results presented clearly and analysed appropriately?  Do the conclusions 
adequately tie together the other elements of the paper?: I have indicated a few suggestions 
to improve the concluding part. The results are presented clearly although I think a strong 
connection with what other authors have done is missing. A revised version should definitely 
include that.
5. Implications for research, practice and/or society:  Does the paper identify clearly any 
implications for research, practice and/or society?  Does the paper bridge the gap between 
theory and practice? How can the research be used in practice (economic and commercial 
impact), in teaching, to influence public policy, in research (contributing to the 
body of knowledge)?  What is the impact upon society (influencing public attitudes, affecting 
quality of life)?  Are these implications consistent with the findings and conclusions of the 
paper?: There is room for improvement. My report is asking for these details.
6. Quality of Communication:  Does the paper clearly express its case, measured against the 
technical language of the field and the expected knowledge of the journal's readership?  Has 
attention been paid to the clarity of expression and readability, such as sentence structure, 
jargon use, acronyms, etc.: Yes quality of communication is acceptable.







By selecting "Yes" you are opting in to the Publons service and data about this review 
(including your name and the review itself) will be transferred to Publons. You may opt-
out of the service at any time.: No


































































Information transparency and pricing strategy in the Scottish housing market.
Thanks for asking for an assessment of this manuscript. The manuscript reports an 
interesting topic. However, I have some reservations about this version. Firstly, the abstract is 
not included.
However, the major shortcoming of this study is the inherent weakness in the research 
background. There are no concise, convincing,  and supporting reasons why this research is 
needed in Scotland. The writing style is not academic. References are not provided for 
most of the statements made in the manuscript. The discussion is firmly regional and highly 
opinionated.  The references cited are dated.
We thank you for the comments. We have elaborated on the research objectives and 
background and why the research is important (in a manner suggested by the first reviewer). 
We have also added 18 more highly relevant references to enrich the LR and link our paper 
to similar findings in the existing literature, making it less subjective and opinionated, as well 
as less regional. We have included a number of recently published papers as references to 
increase the “currency” of the research.
There is no clear section for research methodology in the manuscript. It is very important to 
provide the research methodology for a manuscript like this. The section should detail the 
justification for the constructs in the manuscript. The “Data and Empirical models”[sections 4 
and 5] should part of the research methodology.  The results and discussion require 
rethinking. The discussion should be expanded and current references should be provided to 
support the findings.
We thank you for the comments given by the reviewer. We have included a long paragraph 
to describe the research methodology (hedonic modelling and spatial lag modelling), 
explaining why SLM is utilised with references to the existing literature. 
We also thank the reviewer for suggesting that Section 4 and Section 5 should be merged 
(under Research Methodology). However, on second thought, we are of the view that the 
two sections should be separate as they are, given the long length of each section. Indeed a 
lot of similar studies in the literature discuss Data and Research Methodology separately. We 
believe that merging the two sections would reduce the overall readability of the paper.
The findings should be compared with the findings elsewhere.  With respect to H2, the R-
squared and adjusted R-squared are low. How will these results influence the 
conclusions?  Please provide detailed discussion with respect to H3 and please clarify 
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equation 9 and the results associated with it. With respect to H2, floor, WC, heating, and 
glazed?
We have compared our research findings with those of other studies, particularly in relation 
to the spatial autocorrelation effects and the impact of hedonic variables on property value. 
We have also explained why a low R2 (or adjusted R2) should not affect the conclusions of 
our study (please refer to footnote 19). We have removed H3 from the text (it was just a typo 
from an earlier version of this manuscript, we apologise for that). We have provided more 
clarifications in relation to Equation 9 as well as the results on the hedonic variables the 
reviewer mentioned.
Please describe the shortcomings of this research clearly and rewrite the conclusion to be 
concise and focused on the results and discussion of this research.
We have included a paragraph which describes the shortcomings of our research. We have 
also removed a large chuck of the first paragraph in Section 7 to make the conclusion more 
concise and succinct. The new version focuses mainly on the key findings in relation to H1 
and H2 of the paper based on the Discussion Section.
Best wishes from this referee
Additional Questions:
1. Originality:  Does the paper contain new and significant information adequate to justify 
publication? (i.e. is it a contribution to knowledge?): To high extent
2. Relationship to Literature:  Does the paper demonstrate an adequate understanding of the 
relevant literature in the field and cite an appropriate range of literature sources?  Is any 
significant work ignored to your knowledge?: To a less extent
3. Methodology:  Is the paper's argument built on an appropriate base of theory, concepts, 
or other ideas?  Has the research or equivalent intellectual work on which the paper is based 
been well designed?  Are the research methods employed appropriate?: To some extent
4. Results:  Are results presented clearly and analysed appropriately?  Do the conclusions 
adequately tie together the other elements of the paper?: To some extent
5. Implications for research, practice and/or society:  Does the paper identify clearly any 
implications for research, practice and/or society?  Does the paper bridge the gap between 
theory and practice? How can the research be used in practice (economic and commercial 
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impact), in teaching, to influence public policy, in research (contributing to the 
body of knowledge)?  What is the impact upon society (influencing public attitudes, affecting 
quality of life)?  Are these implications consistent with the findings and conclusions of the 
paper?: To some extent
6. Quality of Communication:  Does the paper clearly express its case, measured against the 
technical language of the field and the expected knowledge of the journal's readership?  Has 
attention been paid to the clarity of expression and readability, such as sentence structure, 
jargon use, acronyms, etc.: To a very high extent
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Information transparency and pricing strategy in the Scottish housing market 
1. Introduction
Pricing strategy has been an important concept in both theoretical and empirical modelling 
of housing transactions which is envisaged to impact upon the number of bids, final 
transaction price and the length of time to sell a home (Kang and Garnder, 1989; Yavas and 
Yang, 1995; Forgey et al., 1996; Arnold, 1999; Anglin et al., 2003; Pryce, 2011, Thanos and 
White, 2014). Equally, the evaluation of asking prices is also important in the valuation 
process, where estimated market value is derived from recently transacted comparable sale 
prices. As such, bias in the asking prices of comparable properties can distort the market value 
estimate of the subject property, which in turn could lead to a divergence between the market 
value estimate and the sale price (Rabianski, 1992).
 It is widely accepted that there is a degree of information asymmetry in most housing 
markets between sellers and buyers. This occurs when sellers and their agents have better 
knowledge of a property’s qualities and location, whereas buyers are perceived to be less well 
informed (Lin and Vandell, 2007; Pope, 2008; Wong et al., 2012, Nanda and Ross, 2012). This 
effect of the improvement in information symmetry has been examined by a number of 
studies (for example, Pope, 2008; Nanda and Ross, 2012). Whilst numerous studies have 
investigated the impact of the introduction of property condition disclosure regulations on 
the selling prices, more limited analysis has been undertaken to examine the potential 
changes in the pricing strategy of the sellers.
In Scotland, the improvement in information transparency on housing transactions was also 
enforced by regulations. The Home Report scheme was introduced in December 2008,  
requiring the seller of a residential property to provide a Single Survey, an Energy Report, and 
a questionnaire when listing the property on the market. The Scottish government introduced 
the scheme with three main objectives: to improve information about a property’s condition, 
to address the cost and efficiency issue associated with multiple valuations and surveys, and 
to address the problems created by the practice of setting artificially low asking prices (Black 
et al. 2015). Indeed, this artificial setting of low asking prices1 has traditionally been common 
1 The “asking price” in the “price over” (which is explained in section 2) context is not the reservation price that 
sellers would expect to achieve, or it is a ceiling price in many housing markets where buyers normally 
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practice in Scotland, especially during periods of market upturns and sustained growth. This 
approach whilst benefitting sellers from the uncertainty and competition among potential 
buyers, has been heavily and publicly criticised for leading people, who cannot afford the 
property, paying for surveys to be undertaken. Consequently, to evaluate the extent to which 
the scheme met the initial objectives, the Scottish government carried out a five-year review 
in 2014.  The findings emanating from the review illustrated that, on first showing, the scheme 
appeared to be successful, nonetheless, when specifically addressing the issue relating to the 
setting artificially low asking prices, the government’s review was far less conclusive on how 
much this is due to poorer market conditions. 
Accordingly, this paper attempts to complement the government review and provide some 
additional evidence as to the evaluation of potential changes in pricing strategy as a result of 
the implementation of the Home Report scheme. In this regard, we examine the potential 
changes in the relationship between asking and seller’s perceived reservation price and 
further explore the explanations for such changes using auction theories relative to the 
Scottish sealed bid context. Using housing transaction data pre and post the introduction of 
the Home Report, we empirically test  whether there has been a significant statistical 
difference in asking price relative to the “value” of the property since the introduction of the 
scheme.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the background of 
the Scottish housing market and the rationale for the enactment of the Home Report scheme. 
Section 3 explores the theories relative to pricing strategy in housing auctions with Section 4 
offering descriptions of the data used within the empirical analysis. Sections 5 and 6 explain 
the empirical modelling and provide a discussion of the empirical findings, with Section 7 
drawing conclusions. 
2. Background of the Scottish housing market
The Scottish housing market has some unique characteristics. The dominant selling 
mechanism is the “price over” system, where properties on the market are listed as “offers 
over” or “price over” an amount set. When there is more than one potential buyer, the seller 
negotiate downward from an asking price.  It acts more like a “guide price”, which sends a signal to potential 
buyers that the seller is expecting to achieve a certain amount above of this price (Pryce, 2011).
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sets a “closing date” on which, offers from all the bidders are submitted in the form of first 
price sealed bid auction, and the highest offer tends to be accepted2. Gibb (1992) suggests 
that through uncertainties and opportunities created by this sealed bid system, sellers can 
capture economic rent. This is also supported by game theory which indicates that sealed bid 
auctions favour sellers in a strong market where the number of potential bidders is relatively 
large, and bidders are likely to be “risk averse”3. However, this system could be viewed as an 
“unethical system” from a buyer’s perspective mainly because it leaves estate agents open to 
accusations of setting artificially low asking prices to create fictitious competition, leading 
people who cannot afford the property paying for surveys.  
In 2008, a new regulation - the Home Report was introduced to the Scottish housing market. 
By law, dwellings4 listed on the market from the 1st December 2008 are required to have a 
Home Report undertaken.  This report consists of a Single Survey, an energy report and a 
questionnaire. The Single Survey is a level 2 Homebuyers Survey and Valuation (HSV) 
equivalent survey5, which includes a valuation. It should be highlighted that many mortgage 
lenders accept this valuation as the collateral value of the property. Sellers are responsible 
for the cost of the home Report, and any potential buyer can access the report via selling 
agents and property solicitor centres free of charge.
The scheme was introduced with three overarching objectives. The government believed that 
the scheme would improve housing market stability by providing the essential information 
about the properties to the buyers. However,  this was met with concerns pertaining to the  
upfront cost of the scheme and also in relation to potential conflict of interests in the sense 
that “the surveyor must produce a report that will be used by both the seller and buyer, two 
parties that have opposing interests in the property transaction – particularly in regards to the 
valuation and the repair categories” (Black, et al. 2015:5).
2 Sellers may also consider other conditions of the offer, such as proposed entry date.
3 Bidders being risk averse refers to the fear of not being able to win the auction.
4 This includes all private properties listed in the market, excluding “right to buy” properties, and some of the 
new developments.
5According to Royal Institute of Charter Surveyors (RICS), level 2 HSV shows the condition of the property, and 
includes a market valuation and insurance rebuild costs. It also provides guidance to legal advisors and advice 
on defects that may affect the value of the property such as repairs, and ongoing maintenance.
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The government’s five-year review of the scheme included both a public consultation6 and a 
research study7 where all three objectives of Home Report were evaluated. Whilst the public 
consultation found that the majority of the respondents considered the scheme to be an 
improvement, it did still highlight concerns regarding the setting of unrealistic asking prices. 
Indeed, the findings indicated that while the valuation helped prevent the occurrence of 
artificially low asking price (to a certain degree), it is less useful in doing so in a rising market 
(Robertson & Blair, 2014). That said, the research study also suggested that relatively poorer 
market conditions could also have contributed in addressing the issue of artificially low asking 
prices (Black, et al. 2015). Further, the findings of the government’s five-year review of the 
Home Report is based on both qualitative data and descriptive analysis. In this regard, it 
acknowledges but fails to control for the effect of changes in market conditions on pricing 
behaviours.  With the use of a rich set of market transaction data for a specific case study 
area, North East Scotland, this paper complements the government review by providing 
further quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of the policy objective in relation to price 
setting in the housing market.
3. Seller’s pricing strategy in Scottish housing market
In most housing markets, asking prices are typically set by agreement between the seller and 
the acting agent. This is determined according to knowledge of the acquisition price, the costs 
of improvements and maintenance, housing attributes, and the selling prices of similar 
properties nearby. Selling agents have insightful local market knowledge and more 
comprehensive information and data on recent transactions, based on which they advise their 
clients on a pricing strategy. As highlighted by Thanos and White (2014), asking prices are 
therefore set according to the strategic behaviour of sellers with private values, as well as a 
perception of the “common value” element in the market advised by selling agents – the 
“expert advice”. 
Search model analysis as proffered by Yavas and Yang (1995:366) argues that asking price 
serves as a signalling function “that maps the listing price to the seller’s valuation of the 
6 Chartered surveyors, legal profession and estate agent respondents, local authorities, construction industry 
respondents, consumer, advice & campaign groups and property management, maintenance and conservation 
respondents were consulted.
7 The research study surveyed 928 households in Scotland.
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property”. This implies that a lower asking price signals that the seller might accept a lower 
price, therefore increases the probability of sale and increases the expected selling price 
through this channel (Horowitz 1992; Yavas & Yang, 1995; Pryce, 2011). However, in a market 
where the asking price serves as a ceiling price, a lower asking price also reduces the upper 
end of the potential bids distribution, thus reduces the expected sale price (Horowitz 1992; 
Yavas & Yang, 1995). Consequently, sellers in such markets often face a trade-off between 
the time on the market (selling quickly) and achieving a higher sales price. 
In the Scottish housing market, the “price over” asking price is not a ceiling price, the common 
“expert advice”, certainly prior to the introduction of the Home Report, was to set an asking 
price below that of the expected selling price to achieve a high price (Levin and Pryce, 2007). 
In a sense, the “price over” amount is equivalent to a starting price in a conventional auction. 
There are two conflicting theories regarding the influence of starting price in auctions. The 
first suggests that a low starting price reduces the barrier to an auction, therefore increases 
the number of potential bidders (Ariely and Simonson, 2003; Kamins et al., 2004; Simonson 
and Ariely, 2005). This auction theory suggests that the optimal bid from each bidder in a 
sealed price auction rises as the number of bidders increases under both the “private value” 
and “common value” models8, implying that a higher selling price is expected with greater 
number of bidders (Wilson, 1997; Laffont, 1996). Indeed, Ooi et al. (2006) illustrate such 
relationships in a theoretical model based on “private value”, and also provide empirical 
evidence that supports the theoretical analysis using sealed price auction data on land 
transactions in Singapore. Equally, research undertaken by Levin and Pryce (2007) employed 
a simulation model based on a hypothetical database of 30,000 house valuations in the 
Scottish “price over” system. Their results found that the probability of extreme bids (high 
selling price) increased from over 5% to 18% when the number of bidders rises from 1 to 4. 
8 It is worth noting that auction theories tend to distinguish between two models that make assumptions on the 
information possessed by participants concerning the valuation of the auction subject in question, namely the 
“independent private value” and “common value” models. With the independent private value model, each 
bidder is assumed to have his own valuation and different realisations of the value of the auction subject 
(Paarsch and Hong, 2006). Knowing other bidders’ valuations will not change the bidder valuation. In a “common 
value” model, the actual value is the same for all bidders. Bulow and Klemperer (2002) suggest that a house’s 
value has both elements, but due to complicity, housing auctions are normally modelled under either value. 
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This confirms that the setting of low asking prices to attract bidders in the Scottish offers over 
system therefore seems to be a logical strategy.
Arguably, the winning bid is also influenced by bidders’ risk aversion, in a sealed bid 
environment. Risk aversion does not alter bidder’s behaviour in an open auction, because 
they, in theory, will stop bidding if the reservation price is reached9. However, in a sealed 
auction, a risk averse bidder (who has the fear of losing) may also be willing to pay a premium 
– in the form of a higher bid – for the insurance of winning (Maskin and Riley, 1985)10. As 
Pryce (2011) contends, this provides an explanation for the supposed popularity of the offers 
over system during market upswings, as buyers are more “desperate” to buy: dwellings are 
selling relatively fast, and buyers face higher opportunity costs to viewing as the probability 
of viewed dwellings being sold to other buyers increase. By setting low asking price, the seller 
increases the probability of viewings, thereby increases the probability of a viewer submitting 
a bid due to the risk of not finding a better alternative during his search period.
An alternative theory regarding starting price is that the initial price represents what Tversky 
and Kahenamn (1974) describe as an anchor. More specifically, a low starting price would 
indicate a low value and result in fewer bidders and a low(er) winning bid (Ariely and 
Simonson. 2003). Empirical studies examining this concept have tended to find mixed effects 
of starting price on the final winning bid in online English auctions (Ariely and Simonson, 2003; 
Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007). However, there has been limited analysis of starting price in 
sealed bid real estate auctions. It is important to note that the influence of starting price on 
the final selling price in an auction is likely to diminish if salient reference prices are available 
(Ariely and Simonson, 2003). For example, if consumers have a well-established reference 
price for an auctioned subject, the starting price may have relatively small effect on the final 
price. This may explain the rationale of using methods such as those adopted in the Home 
Report to address the problems associated with the setting of artificially low asking prices. 
The fundamental change with the scheme is that the Home Report Valuation acts as a “price 
marker” for buyers and is often used in negotiation over price (Black et al., 2015). Since the 
valuation serves as the reference price, it is more likely to serve the “signalling function” of 
seller’s reservation price. Importantly, it also indicates the collateral value for mortgage 
9 Ignoring irrational exuberance.
10 see Maskin and Riley, 1985 for a full discussion of their theoretical model for this argument.
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purposes, therefore reduces the level of uncertainty for the buyers.  With all these respects, 
the valuation is likely to determine the potential bids distribution, and there is less incentive 
for the sellers to set an asking price that derives hugely from the valuation. Arguably, the 
effect of the Home Report scheme is that the “price over” asking price has become more 
correlated to valuations, which are normally obtained through the comparable method using 
market transactions of recently sold nearby properties. 
Based on the discussion above, we posit, firstly, that spatial autocorrelation of asking prices 
to selling price of properties in proximity should have increased since the implementation of 
the Home report as property prices are determined, to a large degree, on the basis of values 
of nearby properties. Empirically testing this proposition serves to establish whether the 
Home Report has achieved its objectives in relation to market transparency on one hand and 
inform future policy decisions on the other. Secondly, along the same line of logic, it is 
surmised that the Home Report should have reduced the difference between the asking price 
and the underlying value of the subject property given an increased level of transparency in 
the property price discovery process. The degree of such price deviation, we conjecture, 
should be dependent to the neighbourhood characteristic as well as property-level attributes. 
Therefore, this paper sets out to test the following three hypotheses in relation to the 
determination of asking prices of properties in Scotland:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): since the introduction of the Home Report, spatial autocorrelation of 
asking prices to selling price of nearby properties has become more pronounced; and
Hypothesis 2 (H2): the introduction of the Home Report has reduced the deviation of asking 
price from the underlying value of the property.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): the degree of deviation of asking price from the value of the property is 
determined by neighbourhood and property attributes.
By testing the above three hypotheses with market transactions data pre- and post- 
introduction of the Scheme, we should be able to empirically corroborate whether, and to 
what extent, the Home Report Scheme has achieved its stated objectives, and whether the 
property market has become more informationally efficient in terms of pricing. 
4. Data
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Transaction data on private residential properties from Aberdeen Solicitors Property Centre 
(ASPC)11 was obtained on the basis of the non-disclosure agreement between University of 
Aberdeen and ASPC.  The dataset covers the housing market in Aberdeen and Aberdeenshire 
(Figure 1)12, and contains information on the physical attributes of the property, information 
on asking and selling prices, listing dates, transaction dates, and the method of sales. 
[insert figure 1 here]
While the dataset commences in 1984, this study focuses on the time period between the 
second quarter of 1998 and the second quarter of 2013. This is due to the availability of 
geographical coordinates that are used in the analysis. In total, there are 79,648 observations 
in the data from (Q2 1998 to Q2 2013), 90% of which are successful transactions, with less 
than 10% of these properties withdrawn from ASPC without being sold. In total, 70,642 
observations are used in the empirical modelling stage (Section 5), due to missing and 
incomplete variables. Table 1 provides a summary of the variables included in the empirical 
analysis and their descriptions.
[insert Table 1]
During the time period, over 82% of the properties in the dataset were marketed as “price 
over”, whereas “fixed price” dominates the remaining 18% of the sample. The proportion of 
properties marketed as “price over” varies according to market conditions, ranging from 60% 
in the late 1990s to over 90% in mid 2000s. Following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the 
market witnessed a reduction of properties marketed as “price over”, however the popularity 
of this selling mechanism started to increase again in 2010, symbolic of the start of the market 
recovery phase. By 2013, 87% of properties in Aberdeen were marketed as “price over”.
Since the valuations of the properties are not available in the dataset13, a limitation of the 
research is that we cannot directly observe how asking price is set relative to the valuation of 
11 ASPC was the first Solicitors Property Centre established in the UK, and serves as a central marketing place for 
residential properties and small commercial properties in the region. Approximately 90% of private residential 
properties in North East Scotland are marketed through ASPC.
12 The map of Aberdeen Housing Market defined by local authorities is presented in Figure 1, it covers Aberdeen 
city local authority jurisdiction as well the commuting towns in Aberdeenshire.
13 Before the introduction of the Home Report, valuations are instructed by buyers, and often multiple 
valuations were carried for the same properties by different buyers, such information was not recorded by  
ASPC. 
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the market. The asking-selling price spread - “price premium”, is calculated as a percentage 
difference between the transaction price and the asking price14 for each quarter for both 
“price over” transactions and “fixed price” transactions. Figure 2 shows the average deflated 
house price with reference to the right hand side vertical axis, the average price premium for 
“price over” transactions and “fixed price” transactions with reference to the left hand side 
vertical axis during the time period. The average house price is affected by both national and 
local oil and gas dominated economic conditions. 
[insert figure 2 here]
It is evident that fluctuations in “price over” premiums are much more pronounced in the 
time series, with an average of around 6% observed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and 
over 40% in the second quarter of 2007. These changes undoubtedly reflect the market 
upturn witnessed across most, if not all, advanced economies caused by financialisation and 
macroeconomic conditions. Notably, the very large premiums between 2006 and early 2008 
are not due to a few extreme values in the sample. This is in line with the explanations on 
market conditions’ influence on pricing strategy discussed in the previous section. 
The signs of subprime mortgage crisis started in the second quarter of 2007, during which 
time, both house prices and offers over premiums peaked. The decreases of average house 
price commenced from Q3 2007, which was accompanied by a decline in price premiums. 
Nevertheless, “price over” premiums were still relatively large throughout the first three 
quarters of 2008. Notably, the first quarter of 2009, shortly after the introduction of the Home 
Report with observed price premiums for “price over” transactions reducing significantly to 
below 5% on average. Although the average house price also experienced a decrease 
simultaneously, the price decline was relatively insignificant. The average price premium for 
properties sold as “fixed price” on the other hand shows much less variation throughout the 
property cycle. Indeed, Figure 1 suggests that although market conditions play an important 
role in determining “price over” premiums, given the relatively high average price in 
Aberdeen post-GFC, there may be other forces that fundamentally changed the way in which 
the “price over” mechanism works. 
14 Price premium = (sold price – asking price) / asking price


































































To test H1, we start with the following hedonic equation:
 …… (Equation 1)   𝑙𝑛Pi,t = c + ∑
K
k = 1βkSk +δ∑
n
k = 1Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h +ε
                                                                  𝑤𝑖𝑡h 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
where  is the asking price of property  at time ;  is a constant term;  is a bundle of 𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 𝑖 𝑡 𝑐 𝑆𝑘
structural characteristics of the subject property  described in Table 1.  is the implicit price  βk
for the corresponding . Since it is conjectured that sellers also use evidence of recently sold 𝑆𝑘
nearby properties when they set asking price, asking price is therefore expected to correlate 
with nearby properties transaction prices. To account for such pricing behaviour, a 
spatiotemporal term  is included in the equation.  is the actual ∑nk = 1Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h Pj,t ― h
transaction price of property  at time t-h, with 15,  is a spatial weight that 𝑗 ℎ = 2 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑊𝑖,𝑗
reflects the degree as well as the structure of spatial proximity between properties and .  𝑖 𝑗
Mathematically,  can take one of the following forms:𝑊𝑖,𝑗
 ……(Equation 1.1)Wi, j =
1
di, j 
 ……(Equation 1.2)Wi, j =
1
𝑑2𝑖,𝑗 
 ……(Equation 1.3)Wi, j =
1
𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑗 
where  denotes the Euclidean distance measured in meter between property  and ; is 𝑑𝑖, 𝑗 𝑖 𝑗 Wi,j 
so constructed since it is reasonable to assume that sellers would place heavier weight on 
more proximate properties in setting property price. The most typical measures (see Cliff and 
Ord, 1981, Basu, 1998 and Dublin, 1998) include inverse distances (Equation 1.1), inverse 
distances raised to some power (in Equation 1.2, we use distance-squared), and inverse 
exponential distance (Equation 1.3). Moreover, given that , the spatial ∑nk = 1𝑊𝑖, 𝑗 = 1
autoregressive term  suggests a weighted average of spatially lagged price 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗,𝑡 ― ℎ
15 We also used longer periods, and two months lag produced the highest spatial correlation coefficient.
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information. The parameter  therefore can indicate the degree to which sellers extract price  𝛿
information from prior sales to ascertain asking prices, and hence H1 can be tested. If past 
information is relevant and applicable,  should be non-zero and statistically significant. In 𝛿
other words, housing prices are spatially auto-correlated. Finally,  is an error term that εi,t
measures the effects stemming from missing variables, misspecification of the model, 
measurement errors and inadequate sampling. This specification essentially assumes a linear 
functional form and fixed parameters. 
It must also be highlighted that while neighbourhood attributes are commonly employed and 
explicitly measured in a typical hedonic model, they are intentionally left out in our analysis. 
We surmise that the inclusion of  can indeed capture a set of neighborhood Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h
features pertaining to the socioeconomic and physical make-up of the neighbourhood and 
accessibility to various urban services and amenities. In addition, variables that are normally 
used to control for market conditions are not included in Equation (1) for the same reason. 
The omission of such variables should thus avoid potential statistical nuisances associated 
with over-specification of our models.
In addition to the spatial autoregressive variable, a dummy variable, , is included 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛
in the hedonic equation to explicitly discern properties that are withdrawn from the market 
after listing. Modifications of the equation yields Equation (2) below:








βkSk + λ𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛 + ε
…...(Equation 2)
where  takes the value 1 if the property is withdrawn from the market, and 0 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛
otherwise; and  is coefficients to be estimated. It is expected that overpriced properties are λ
more likely to experience difficulties to sell, some of which may even be withdrawn from the 
market.
To test H1, which is deduced from the proposition that sellers have become more prone to 
infer asking prices based on actual prices of nearby recently transacted properties since the 
introduction of the Home Report Scheme, thereby increasing the spatial autocorrelation of 
the property prices, Equation (2) is thus modified by including a dummy variable, . 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
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The variable is designed to interact with .  has a value of 1 if the Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
observation occurs on or after 1st December 2008, and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, we develop 
Equation (3) as follows:












βkSk + λ𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑛 + ε
 …… (Equation 3)                                                                    𝑤𝑖𝑡h 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
The coefficient of   is expected to be positive and statistically significant, if sellers have ρ
indeed given more weight to nearby transactions when they set asking prices for the subject 
properties since the introduction of the Home Report. In other words, we should observe a 
stronger spatial autocorrelation between asking prices and nearby transaction prices after 
the scheme came into effect.
Testing H2
The second hypothesis formulated in this paper tests whether there is a reduction in deviation 
between asking price and the “value” of the property after the implementation of the scheme. 
More specifically, it tests whether potential house sellers are less inclined to market their 
properties by setting an unrealistically low asking price relative to the properties’ potential 
market value after December 2008. To measure the degree of such pricing deviation,  16 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
is used:
    …… (Equation 4)𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖 =
𝑃𝐴𝑖
𝑃𝐸𝑖
where   is the actual asking price of property , and  is the estimated value of the property 𝑃𝐴𝑖 𝑖 𝑃𝐸𝑖
obtained from the following equation:









 …… (Equation 5)𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
Where  is the sale price of property  at time .  is the fitted value of   for each P′i, t  𝑖 𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑖 P′i, t
dwelling obtained by estimating Equation (5). 
16 This follows the concept of degree of overpricing in Kang and Garder (1989); Yavas and Yang (1995); Donald 
et al (1996); Anglin et al (2003); and Pryce (2011). Seller’s pricing strategy is presented by an asking price 
relative to the value of the property.
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We further posit that  is a function of the structural variable , since sellers are Devi,t Sk
expected to have better knowledge of the quality of the property, and their pricing strategy 
should reflect this accordingly. Pryce (2011) argues that the asking-selling price spread is likely 
to contain a locational convention  (i.e. neighbourhoods may have implicit conventions on 𝛾 ∗𝑘
asking-selling price spread). However,  is not directly observable in the dataset, we 𝛾 ∗𝑘
therefore use the standard deviation of the actual asking-selling price spread  within the 𝜎𝑖,𝑘
neighbourhood  as a proxy for the locational convention:𝑘
…… (Equation 6)𝜎𝑖, 𝑘 = 𝑆𝐷(𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑘)
Neighbourhood is defined as a 3-kilometre radius circle17 centred at property . In addition, 𝑘  𝑖
we only consider transactions that occur within the past two months prior to the sale of 
property  when computing . One would expect that within a neighbourhood , if the 𝑖 𝜎𝑖,𝑘 𝑘
standard deviation of asking-selling price spread is small, there is likely to be a “locational 𝜎𝛾𝑖𝑘 
convention”. On the other hand, if the variation in the asking-selling price spread is large, the 
evidence of locational convention  should be less apparent. To test this, Equation (7) is 𝛾 ∗𝑘
constructed.  is expected to have a significant effect on  and  should be negative 𝜎𝑖, 𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝜔
and statistically significant. Furthermore, it has been established that market conditions also 
play an important role in price setting (Pryce, 2011), hence, we posit that ,  a time dummy 𝑇
variable (with a coefficient   to be estimated) measured on a monthly basis, should affect φ
:𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
=  …… (Equation 7)𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 c + ∑
K
k = 1βkSk +𝜔𝜎𝑖, 𝑘 + φT + ε
Lastly,   is added to Equation (8) to test H2. We believe that the Home Report should 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
have a market-wide impact on how sellers set their initial prices. In particular, the practice of 
setting artificially low asking prices to draw more potential house buyers to bid will cease to 
a large extent. Accordingly, we re-write Equation (7) as follows:
= Ω  …… (Equation 8)𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 c + 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008 +  ∑
K
k = 1βkSk +𝜔𝜎𝑖, 𝑘 + φT +ε
 is expected to be positive and statistically significant.Ω
We estimate the equations using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods. Our models are 
designed in such a way that only past events can exert influence on current events but not 
vice versa. This can largely avoid statistical inference problems such as endogeneitiy in the 
spatial lag terms. Provided that the error terms of the equations are independent and 
identically distributed, the OLS estimator will be asymptotically efficient and consistent. The 
summary statistics of the variables are shown in Table 2. 
17 The choice of the size of neighbourhood k is not arbitrarily determined. Indeed, the size of Aberdeen city 
(including Old Aberdeen) is roughly equal to that of a 3-km radius circle. 
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[Insert Table 2 here]
6. Regression results and discussions
Results for H1
Table 3 presents the regression results for Equation (1) to (3) using the three specifications of 
spatial weight respectively. The p-value for each variable is given in brackets. The last three 
rows of the table display the R-squared, adjusted R-squared and F-statistics of the models. 
[Insert Tables 3  here]
Most coefficients estimated using Equation (1) in all three measures of spatial weight show 
the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. For example, sellers are 
prone to demand a higher price for qualities such as extra bedrooms, public rooms, 
bathrooms, central heating, garage(s), double glazing, and cloak room (WC). New properties 
also tend to have a higher asking price. Dummy variable  yields negative coefficients 𝐺𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛
with all three spatial weighting specifications, which seems to be counter-intuitive. However, 
these coefficients became statistically insignificant once selling mechanisms and withdrawn 
properties are specified. 
In regard to testing H1, which states that asking prices are assumed to be spatially linked to 
prices of nearby properties sold within the previous two months. We observe that the 
coefficient of the spatial lag term, , is 0.0339, 0.1599, and 0.1131 under that three different  δ
spatial specifications, and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This confirms our view that 
the housing prices are spatially auto-correlated. Of significance is the positive sign of the 
coefficient, which implies that house prices seem to move in tandem with one another: a 
higher (lower) price of a neighbouring property will generally result in a higher (lower) asking 
price of the subject property. Interestingly, the effect of  are very different across Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h
the three specifications with the size the magnitude of the variable appearing to be larger 
when non-liner measures (as in Equation 1.2 and Equation 1.3) are employed. Overall, the 
models achieve an explanatory power of around 50%.
As a modification of Equation (1), Equation (2) is designed to examine how properties that 
are withdrawn from the market are priced differently by the sellers. The coefficients on 
Withdrawn, significant at the 1% level, range from 0.1390 to 0.1769 across the three spatial 
weight specifications, suggesting that this category of properties tend to be priced 15%-19% 
higher than the others, ceteris paribus. 
Equation (3) incorporates an interaction term, , to the model, which is  𝐷𝑒𝑐2008 × Wi,j𝑙𝑛Pj,t ― h
designed to examine whether property sellers rely more on prior sales from the 
neighbourhood in ascertaining asking prices after the inception of the Home Report scheme. 
We find that the coefficients on the interaction term with all three specifications are around 
0.05 and significant at the 1% level. This confirms our belief that after December 2008, asking 
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prices are more spatially dependent on nearby sale prices by virtue of the price discovery 
process of the sellers given a more informationally efficient housing market. 
Results for H2
Equation (7) is formulated to investigate the determinants of pricing strategy, which is 
measured as the asking price relative to the estimated value derived from our hedonic model. 
Equation (8) further incorporates a dummy variable that indicates the introduction of the 
Home Report to test H2. Table 4 depicts the regressions results for H2 under the three spatial 
weighting specifications. 
[insert Table 4]
Examining the results for Equation (7), locational convention measure  yields negative and 𝜎𝑖, 𝑘
significant coefficients with Equation (1.2) and (1.3) specifications. This is in line with our 
expectation that in a neighbourhood where there is a higher variation in the asking-selling 
price spread, the effect of locational convention should be less apparent with sellers being  
more likely to set asking prices that diverge more from the underlying values. The results also 
reveal that some housing attributes exhibit statistically significant effect on the dependent 
variable, suggesting that sellers do consider certain housing attributes such as number of 
bedrooms and heating systems when pricing their properties.
Lastly,  is incorporated to Equation (8) to test H2. Its coefficient is 0.0523, 0.0274, 𝐷𝑒𝑐2008
0.0397 under the three spatial weight specifications (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3) respectively. In all 
three cases, the coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Mathematically, it can be 
interpreted that there is a reduction in asking price-valuation deviation. More specifically, the 
ratio between asking price and the value of the property is 3%-5% closer to 1. This suggests 
that the marketing strategies employed to set unrealistically low asking prices by the sellers 
have become less evidenced since the introduction of the Home Report scheme, however the 
magnitude of such effect is relatively small. 
In terms of R-squared and adjusted R-squared, our models achieve an explanatory power of 
around 40% for all the three spatial weight specifications. The estimation is marginally 
improved when location convention measure is taken into consideration. One might argue 
that the relatively low R-square could undermine the validity of the findings of the study. 
However, the main emphasis of this paper is on whether the Scheme affects the way sellers 
determine asking prices, not on the discovery of various determinants of valuation deviation 
of real estate price formation. Therefore, it should be highlighted that only the improvement 
of R-square, as well as the signs and statistical significance of the variables of interest in the 
models that are of crucial relevance to our research.
As a robustness test, we generate Equation (9) by discarding all statistically insignificant 
structural variables with p-value below 1% in Equation (8). It is shown that the results are 
highly consistent with those of the other models.

































































Understanding the underlying price determination process and dynamics of real estate is 
important from the viewpoints of buyers, sellers and other stakeholders, especially in a 
market that is characterised by information inefficiency, a diverse composition of market 
players as well as heterogeneity of quality of housing. This study aims to empirically evaluate 
the effectiveness of the Home Report Scheme introduced and implemented in Scotland in 
2008, which was designed to improve information efficiency about property condition as well 
as address the often-criticized malpractice of setting artificially low list prices by property 
sellers. To achieve this, we examine how sellers determine asking prices in an information 
search context with the use of a large number of real estate transactions in the North East of 
Scotland. By subjecting the analysis in a hedonic setting that explicitly incorporates a spatial 
process of price discovery using spatial lag modelling techniques and controls for a large 
number of housing attributes (i.e. to test H1), we find strong prima facie evidence that 
property sellers have become more prone to rely on prior sales to form asking prices since 
the Scheme came into effect, as indicated by an elevated level of spatial autocorrelation in 
the sample house prices across all statistical models examined. The once-common practice of 
setting artificially low asking price with the aim to attract buyers seems to have dwindled to 
a certain extent. In other words, after the introduction of the Scheme, real estate sellers seem 
to have set prices on a basis that is more closely in line with the general market conditions 
and the underlying value of property. The results of testing H2 in our analysis, which compares 
price divergence pre- and post- 2018, further confirms this conjecture.
A major learning outcome of this study is to provide robust evidence-based justifications for 
necessary government interventions to help address issues associated with market failures 
stemming from information asymmetry between buyers and sellers within a property market. 
Prior to the introduction of the Home Report, problems concerning the propensity of property 
sellers in Scotland artificially lowering initial asking prices were rife, placing potential buyers 
in a relatively weaker bargaining position. Indeed, an early investigation by Akerlof (1970) 
suggests that information asymmetry, which deters market participants from making 
mutually advantageous trade in a free enterprise economy, is particularly more widespread 
in markets dominated by second-hand assets such as direct real estate. This is due to the fact 
that sellers of second-hand homes are better informed about the quality of the dwellings than 
the buyers, and consequently creating an unlevel playing field when it comes to pricing. Our 
empirical results support the view that government should play a more active role in 
facilitating transactions in the real estate market by putting forward measures that counteract 
such information asymmetry in property pricing, ensuring a higher degree of market 
transparency which could result in enhanced market information efficiency and equitability 
that benefit not only the market players but also the society at large.
From a methodological stance, this study demonstrates how housing policies can be 
empirically evaluated and scrutinised in the framework of spatial hedonic price modelling, 





























































International Journal of Housing M
arkets and Analysis
17
which is one of the greatest departures from the mainstream real estate literature.  Existing 
approaches to examining institutional arrangements of housing market have been 
predominately normative or descriptive in nature, often producing elusive and subjective 
explanations, conclusions and implications that cannot be hypothesised and/or validated with 
empirical data. Last but not least, we believe that the findings of the study yield both 
theoretical and practical insights into real estate price formation, which are of great use and 
interest to policymakers, real estate developers, individual homebuyers, financial institutions 
and property professionals. 
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Figure 1. Housing market areas of Aberdeen city and Aberdeenshire.
Source: Aberdeen City Council
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Figure 2, Asking-selling price premiums and average real house price in Aberdeen 
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Table 1: descriptions of variables:
Variable Description/Type
Heating type (Heating) 1 if property has central heating, =0  if property has no heating or 
any other form of heating
Double Glazed 1 if property has double glazing, otherwise =0
Garden 1 if property has garden(s), otherwise =0 
Floor Number of floor stories within the dwelling: 1 for flat and 
bungalows, 2 or more for multi-storey houses
Bathroom Number of bathrooms.
Bedroom Number of bedrooms
WC Number of separate toilets/cloak rooms
Public Number of public rooms, including kitchen, lounge, conservatory, 
play room, etc.
𝐷𝑒𝑐2008 1 if property was listed on and after December 1st 2008, otherwise 
=0
Garage If a property has a garage(s)
New 1 if property is a new build, otherwise =0
Withdrawn 1 if property was withdrawn from the market, otherwise=0
Type D 1 if dwelling is detached property, otherwise=0
Type F 1 if dwelling is a flat, otherwise=0
Type N 1 if dwelling is non-detached property, otherwise=0
Dev Ratio: the deviation between asking price and the “value” of the 
property after the implementation of the scheme.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the main variables
Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pi,t GBP£ 131 239 107 836 9000 3500000
𝑉𝑖,𝑡 GBP£ 134 097 106 729 24077 6002596
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 Ratio 0.9999 0.0244 0.8320 1.3730
𝑆𝐷(𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑘) --- 0.2761 0.0022 0.2017 0.3183
Heating Dummy Var. 0.8128 0.3900 0 1
DoubleGlazed Dummy Var. 0.8778 0.3274 0 1
Garden Dummy Var. 0.5971 0.4904 0 1
Floor Number 1.4585 0.5596 1 6
Bathroom Number 0.9165 0.3599 0 4
Bedroom Number 2.3297 1.1398 0 9
Garage Number 0.3637 0.6038 0 8
WC Number 0.1630 0.3784 0 3
Public Number 1.4747 0.8033 0 14
𝐷𝑒𝑐2008 Dummy Var. 0.2450 0.4301 0 1
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Table 3: Regression results for Equations 1 to 3 
Dependent 
Variable
𝐏𝐢,𝐭       𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭 𝐏𝐢,𝐭
Spatial Weight 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋
Independent 
Variables
Eqn 1 Eqn 2 Eqn 3 Eqn 1 Eqn 2 Eqn 3 Eqn 1 Eqn 2 Eqn 3














































































































































































































































































Included Obs. 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642 70642
𝑅2 0.5085 0.5218 0.6600 0.5293 0.5476 0.6759 0.5229 0.5399 0.6720
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅2 0.5084 0.5217 0.6599 0.5292 0.5475 0.6759 0.5228 0.5398 0.6719
Prob (F Stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: p-values are in brackets
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Table 4: Regression results for Equations 7 to 9
Dependent 
Variable
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
Spatial Weight 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 𝟏/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝐝𝐢, 𝐣 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒅𝟐𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋 1/𝒆𝒅𝒊,𝒋
Independent 
Variables


















































































































































































































































Included Obs. 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070 64070
𝑅2 0.4435 0.4449 0.4446 0.3946 0.3950 0.3945 0.4005 0.4013 0.4009
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅2 0.4420 0.4434 0.4431 0.3930 0.3934 0.3930 0.3988 0.3997 0.3994
Prob (F Stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: p-values are in brackets
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